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INTRODUCTION
Since their invention in 1982, shareholder rights plans have been the subject of
intense controversy.1 Rights plans, or as they are known more pejoratively “poison
pills,” enable a target board to “poison” a takeover attempt by making it
prohibitively expensive for a bidder to acquire more than a certain percentage of

† Copyright © 2012 Paul H. Edelman and Randall S. Thomas.
* Professor of Law and Professor of Mathematics, Vanderbilt University.
** John Beasley Professor of Law and Business and Professor of Management,
Vanderbilt University. We thank Chancellor William Chandler, Chancellor Leo Strine,
Gregory V. Varallo, and the participants of the 2011 Annual Conference of the Weinberg
Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware for very helpful comments
on this paper and David Barnes for excellent research assistance.
1. The first poison pill was developed by Martin Lipton in 1982 in his defense of The
El Paso Company from a hostile bid. Len Costa, The Perfect Pill: A Small Innovation that
Transformed Corporate Takeovers, LEGAL AFF. (Mar./Apr. 2005), available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2005/toa_costa_marapr05.msp; see also
Randall S. Thomas, Judicial Review of Defensive Tactics in Proxy Contests: When Is Using
a Rights Plan Right?, 46 VAND. L. REV. 503, 505–06 (1993).
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the target company’s stock (until recently 15–20%).2 The poison pill can be put in
place by the target’s board without shareholder approval and can be revoked solely
at the discretion of the board.3 Not surprisingly, some commentators view rights
plans as choking off the market for corporate control and impermissibly shifting
power from shareholders to directors.4 In some jurisdictions, such as the United
Kingdom, shareholder rights plans are unlawful.5
As the epicenter of American corporate law, the tiny state of Delaware,
however, has long viewed rights plans as a useful bargaining device for wellintentioned boards of directors. For the past twenty-five years, the Delaware courts
have considered the legitimacy of the creation and deployment of shareholder
rights plans. The foundational cases for this inquiry began with the Delaware
Supreme Court’s decisions in Moran v. Household International, Inc.,6 which
upheld the creation of the rights plan, and Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,7 which
decided that a board’s use of the shareholder rights plan is subject to judicial
review.8 The Delaware Supreme Court later added an additional gloss to these
decisions in Unitrin v. American General,9 where it held that “preclusive”10 and
“coercive”11 defensive tactics were invalid, while other defensive tactics are
reviewed to determine if they fall within the “range of reasonableness.”12 However,
no one doubts that poison pills are fatal and no acquirer in more than thirty-five
years has dared to swallow one.13

2. MEREDITH M. BROWN, RALPH C. FERRARA, PAUL S. BIRD, GARY W. KUBEK &
WILLIAM D. REGNER, TAKEOVERS: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 1641 (2d ed. 2009).
3. Id. at 16-40.3.
4. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991) (arguing against permitting target board management from using
defensive tactics against proposed takeovers).
5. For a discussion of the international debate over the appropriate place of poison pills
as takeover defenses, see Jennifer G. Hill, Takeovers, Poison Pills and Protectionism in
Comparative Corporate Governance (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No.
168/2010, 2010).
6. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
7. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
8. Id. at 954.
9. Unitrin Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
10. In Versata Enterprises v. Selectica, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court explained that
“[a] defensive measure is preclusive where it ‘makes a bidder’s ability to wage a successful
proxy contest and gain control’ . . . ‘realistically unattainable.’” 5 A.3d 586, 601 (Del. 2010).
Rights plans are generally subjected to scrutiny as potentially preclusive defensive measures.
See id.
11. “A coercive response is one that is ‘aimed at “cramming down” on its shareholders a
management-sponsored alternative.’” Selectica, 5 A.3d at 601 (quoting Unitrin, 651 A.2d at
1387). In this Article, we are not concerned with coercive defensive tactics. They constitute
a very limited, specific set of defenses that are initiated by management, such as
restructurings. In this Article, we focus on the more widely used tactics, such as rights plans
and classified boards.
12. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1388.
13. Sir James Goldsmith was the last bidder to swallow the poison pill. See Mike Tharp,
Goldsmith Wins Fight for Crown Zellerbach Corp.—Agreement Gives Financier Control of
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Since 1985, the Delaware courts have had numerous opportunities to consider
many facets of rights plans. In these cases, the Delaware judges have struck down
some new variations of the poison pill as entrenchment mechanisms,14 but
generally, they have approved traditional rights plans as useful bargaining devices
for well-intentioned boards of directors.15 Most recently, in Air Products and
Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., Chancellor Chandler, in a thoughtful and lengthy
analysis of Delaware precedent, found that that state’s current jurisprudence
permits rights plans to preclude tender offers.16 As a result, the only avenue for
hostile bidders to succeed in their efforts to acquire target companies is by using a
proxy contest for corporate control as the vehicle for removing resistant directors,
and thereby obtaining the power to redeem the poison pill and close their tender
offers.17 This makes it crucial to determine how far incumbents can go in tilting the
voting playing field.
Rights plans’ impact on proxy contests has been the subject of many judicial
decisions. Initially, the courts carefully scrutinized the earliest versions of the rights
plan.18 Moran blessed a rights plan with a 20% “flip-over” trigger on dissident
stock ownership rights,19 which quickly led to the widespread proliferation of pills
with similar trigger levels.20 In the key passage of the decision, the Moran court
Firm’s Board, Names Him Chairman, WALL ST. J., July 26, 1985, at 1.
14. See Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1182, 1198 (Del. Ch. 1998)
(invalidating dead hand pill that can only be redeemed by directors in office when the rights
become exercisable); Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25,
52 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff’d on other grounds, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998) (invalidating no hand
pill that can only be redeemed six months after acquiring company’s new directors take
office).
15. See, e.g., Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., No. 11510, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 121, at
*21–23 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 1990) (rejecting claim under Moran); see also Black v. Hollinger
Int’l, Inc., 872 A.2d 559, 567 (Del. 2005) (approving the use of a rights plan to stop
controlling shareholder from selling company’s largest asset); Account v. Hilton Hotels
Corp., 780 A.2d 245, 250–51 (Del. 2001) (approving adoption of rights plan by board and
allowing the board to amend issued stock to include the rights plan).
16. 16 A.3d 48, 122 n.480 (Del. Ch. 2011). However, the Chancellor “does not endorse
‘just say never.’” Id. at 129.
17. BROWN ET AL., supra note 2, at 16-68.
18. Some courts struck down rights plans on the grounds that they were unfairly
discriminatory against acquirers. See, e.g., Avon Products, Inc. v. Chartwell Assocs., 907
F.2d 322, 323 (2d Cir. 1990); Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1229,
1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). All of those decisions were subsequently overruled by state
legislatures. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 505(2)(i) (McKinney 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§14A:7-7(3) (West 2010).
19. Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1355 (Del. 1985). Rights plans’
‘flip-over’ trigger is pulled when an acquirer that has gained a controlling position in a target
firm seeks to implement a business combination between the target company and another
entity. Thomas, supra note 1, at 511 n.27. Today, as a practical matter, the flip-over trigger
rarely comes into play because unwanted acquirers are deterred from purchasing a
controlling stake in the target by the flip-in trigger’s existence. Id. at 512.
20. The overwhelming majority of American corporations have poison pills already in
place, while the remaining firms could quickly put them in place. See, e.g., John C. Coates
IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79
TEX. L. REV. 271, 267–87, 295 (2000).
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held that it would not allow a rights plan whose trigger level was too low because
such a plan would “fundamentally restrict” the stockholders’ ability to conduct a
successful proxy contest, making it nearly impossible for a dissident shareholder to
elect a board that would redeem the rights plan.21 Without that possibility, the
management of a target firm could hide indefinitely behind a rights plan without
fear of removal.22
Recently, however, a novel form of rights plan has been developed—the NOL
rights plan23—which has a 5% trigger level that is particularly onerous for hostile
bidders. The legitimacy of an NOL rights plan was first put to the test when
Selectica, Inc. (“Selectica”), a Delaware corporation, enacted an NOL pill that
restricted any shareholder from buying more than 4.99% of its voting shares.24
Trilogy, Inc. (and its subsidiary Versata Enterprises, Inc., collectively, “Trilogy”), a
competitor and potential acquirer, purchased more Selectica shares, thereby
deliberately triggering the NOL rights plan.25
In the ensuing Delaware litigation, Trilogy argued that the NOL pill unduly
restricted its ability to win a proxy contest and therefore was a preclusive defensive
tactic that violated Moran and Unitrin.26 The Delaware Supreme Court rejected this
claim in a decision that leaves open the question of how they would rule on other
poison pills with a 5% (or lower) trigger level.
This raises important issues both for potential bidders and their targets.
Presumably the Delaware courts would uphold other NOL rights plans with similar
trigger levels, but is the court’s decision limited to companies, like Selectica, who
have suffered significant economic losses? Or, does it apply more broadly? What
about target companies that drop their pill trigger to 5% claiming that hedge fund
activists pose a serious threat to their corporate well-being?27
In this Article, we seek to provide the Delaware courts with an alternative
approach that will add clarity in the law. We propose a new methodology for courts
that must determine if a rights-plan trigger, or for that matter any defensive tactic,
is preclusive and therefore invalid under Delaware law. We begin by analyzing the

21. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356–57.
22. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 519.
23. See Mark D. Gerstein, Bradley C. Faris, Joseph M. Kronsnoble & Christopher R.
Drewry, Latham & Watkins, LLP, M&A Commentary, Lessons from the First Triggering of
a Modern Poison Pill: Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enterprises, Inc. (Mar. 2009),
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub2563_1.pdf [hereinafter Lessons from
Selectica]. NOLs are net operating loss tax benefits. Weak companies that suffer significant
financial losses may carry them forward to offset taxable income earned subsequently. See
infra Part II.A
24. Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enters., Inc., No. 4241-VCN, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 39, at
*22–25 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2010).
25. Id. at *28.
26. Id. at *70–71.
27. Law firms are already claiming that Selectica validates “acting in concert” poison
pills with 4.99% triggers, which are designed to stop shareholders from engaging in
coordinated activities. See, e.g., Mark D. Gerstein, Implications of Selectica for NextGeneration Poison Pills, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Mar.
30, 2010, 9:21 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/03/30/ implications-ofselectica-for-next-generation-poison-pills/.
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Delaware case law to determine the appropriate legal standard for determining
when defensive tactics are preclusive. We show that the Delaware courts have not
provided clear guidance in their tests for preclusion, particularly in the crucial
Unitrin case, where they give three different tests in the same opinion, and more
recently in Selectica. In order to add clarity and certainty to the law, we argue that
the Delaware courts should return to the original test set forth in Moran—a
defensive tactic is preclusive if it “fundamentally restricts” a dissident
shareholder’s ability to win a proxy contest.
We then argue that the courts should use a new approach to determine when a
defensive tactic “fundamentally restricts” a shareholder’s ability to win a proxy
contest. We develop a voting model that will allow them to transparently consider
all of the key parameters that affect the outcome of corporate elections, including
case-specific information about shareholder ownership patterns and voting
recommendations of third-party voting advisors. Using this model, we illustrate the
effects of lower trigger levels for all rights plans on dissidents’ chances of winning
proxy contests, as well as the effect of the classified board, Employee Stock Option
Plans (ESOPs), and white squire defenses. We find, for instance, that given certain
assumptions about the share ownership patterns of the target firm, the Delaware
Supreme Court was correct in Selectica when it found that the NOL poison pill is
not preclusive.
Finally, we refine our analysis to consider several other significant,
complicating factors, including the type of bidder, the type of contest, and the
differences in third-party voting advisor recommendations that result from these
variations. We argue that the courts should explicitly consider these factors in their
determination with regard to the preclusive effects of defensive tactics. We further
claim that courts should distinguish between the different types of bidders and
voting contests when considering the validity of different defensive tactics. By
doing so, a court will be able to take into account the various wealth effects that
flow from different types of bids.
Our findings show that permitting an across-the-board lowering of rights-plan
trigger levels would shift Delaware law to favor hedge funds and private equity
firms over strategic acquirers, and greatly increase the power of third-party voting
advisors, such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) or Glass Lewis & Co.
(“Glass Lewis”). We argue that there is little reason for corporate law to treat
strategic acquirers worse than hedge funds or private equity funds, as the former
frequently attach higher valuations to the target firm’s assets.28 Nevertheless, an
overly broad reading of Selectica will have this effect for three reasons. First, a
lower poison pill trigger level will decrease the amount of stock that a potential
strategic acquirer can accumulate, making it more difficult for it to prevail in a
proxy contest for corporate control since the acquirer will have control over fewer
votes. This effect will be stronger for strategic acquirers than hedge funds, or

28. Leonce L. Bargeron, Frederik P. Schlingemann, René M. Stulz & Chad J. Zutter,
Why Do Private Acquirers Pay So Little Compared to Public Acquirers?, 89 J. FIN. ECON.
375, 376 (2008) (finding that average premium paid to target shareholders in acquisition by
strategic buyers averaged 40 to 46.5%, whereas private equity firms paid only 28.5%).
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private equity firms, because strategic acquirers use proxy contests for corporate
control more frequently than other types of potential bidders.29
Second, in the past, strategic acquirers have often bought large stakes in targeted
firms, so-called “toeholds,” to offset the costs of an unsuccessful bid in the event
that another bidder tops their offer.30 Reducing the amount of target stock that
strategic acquirers can accumulate lowers the expected value of a takeover attempt
and will adversely affect their incentive to pursue value-enhancing acquisitions.
Strategic bidders’ smaller toeholds in target firms will also reduce their incentives
to launch proxy contests for corporate control as they will receive a smaller
percentage of the benefits from improving target firm operations.
Third, strategic bidders with smaller stakes in target firms will find it harder to
signal to the market that they are serious bidders. An accumulation of a substantial
stake in a target company is a strong signal to the market, and to third-party voting
advisors, both that the acquirer is serious about pursuing the target and that the
acquirer believes that the target is undervalued.31 If the acquirer is prevented by a
rights plan from acquiring a substantial stake in a target firm, then it will be much
more difficult for it to convince other shareholders of its true intentions.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we briefly summarize Delaware’s
jurisprudence on the use of takeover defenses against unsolicited buyers, beginning
with Moran and Unocal, then continuing to Unitrin. We then turn in Part II to an
analysis of the Selectica decision, focusing on the ramifications of that opinion for
the future of poison pills. Part III develops our basic model, while Part IV refines
our analysis to consider the effects of different types of bidders, different types of
contests, and variations in third-party voting advisor recommendations. We
conclude in Part V with a brief discussion of the policy implications of our results.
We discuss the technical details of the model in an Appendix.
I. RIGHTS PLANS AS ROADBLOCKS TO UNWANTED PURCHASERS:
MORAN/UNOCAL/UNITRIN
Prior to the early 1980s, when an unwanted potential acquirer made an
unsolicited tender offer to a target company’s shareholders, the target firm lacked a
rock solid technique for stopping the offer in its tracks. True, the passage of the
Williams Act in 196832 had imposed some degree of order on the terms and
conditions attached to tender offers, and extended, to a minimum of twenty
business days, the time period before a bidder could close its tender offer.33 Despite

29. Confidential email from proxy solicitor to Randall Thomas (Sept. 21, 2011) (on file
with author).
30. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in
Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1777 n.171 (1985) (bidder profits from ownership
stakes in target firm usually offset the bidder’s search costs and bid commencement fees);
James C. Freund & Richard L. Easton, The Three-Piece Suitor: An Alternative Approach to
Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 34 BUS. LAW. 1679 (1979) (discussing common practice
of acquirers buying large stake in target firm before announcing bid).
31. See Selectica, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 39, at *75.
32. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454.
33. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(2010).
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these regulations, however, targets still needed to search high and low for
individually tailored defenses that would enable them to escape the grips of hostile
bidders.
The advent of the rights plan changed this dramatically. Without shareholder
approval, a board of directors could within hours of a hostile tender offer install a
poison pill that would make completing the tender exorbitantly expensive.34
Although the bidder could, in theory, wage a proxy battle to take over the board
and remove the pill, if the pill was combined with other defenses, such as a
classified or staggered board, the resulting delay in completing the deal would be
fatal to the entire acquisition.35 Thus, not surprisingly, bidders frequently sought
judicial relief from the implementation and deployment of poison pills. Because of
Delaware’s position as the epicenter of corporate law developments, the Delaware
courts were quickly confronted with cases challenging all aspects of this new
defense. As we show below, what emerged over time was a judicial standard that
strikes down a poison pill only when a pill “both prevents a tender offer and
unfairly tilts the electoral playing field against an insurgent.”36
A. Moran: Legitimating the Creation of the Poison Pill
The Delaware Supreme Court first considered the validity of rights plans in
Moran v. Household International, Inc.37 Household International’s directors
implemented a rights plan because they were concerned about the company’s
vulnerability as a takeover target. 38 They decided to adopt a poison pill with a 20%
trigger level, but which only included a flip-over trigger designed to stop any
second step business combinations.39 Moran, a director of the company, perhaps

34. The Delaware Supreme Court has ruled that “[d]irectors are not obliged to abandon
a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is
clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.” Paramount Commc’ns., Inc. v. Time, Inc.,
571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1990). In applying Time, a federal judge in Moore Corp. v.
Wallace Computer Services did not require the Wallace board to redeem its poison pill
because Wallace was in the process of implementing a long-term strategy and was only now
starting to reap the benefits of that strategy. See 907 F. Supp. 1545, 1545–55, 1582 (D. Del.
1995). The Court concluded that the board was reasonable in not redeeming the pill so as to
give Wallace’s shareholders enough time to appreciate the value of the long-term strategy.
See id.
35. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV.
887, 923–24 (2002).
36. Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 337 n.182 (Del. Ch.
2010) (emphasis added).
37. See 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
38. Id. at 1349. The directors were concerned about activity in the market that indicated
Household might be a takeover target. Id. This concern was heightened when John Moran,
one of Household’s directors, stated that Household’s stock was undervalued and argued in
favor of a leveraged buyout of Household. Id.
39. Id. at 1348–49. “If the acquirer buys more than the specified percentage of stock,
and then acquires the remaining target company stock in a merger, or other business
combination transaction, the ‘flip-over’ provisions of the Rights Plan allow the holders of the
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disgruntled over the rejection of his proposed leveraged buyout, filed suit seeking
to enjoin the implementation of the poison pill.40
As an initial step, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the directors of a
Delaware corporation had the power to implement a poison pill.41 Undeterred,
Moran,42 contended that the poison pill was invalid because it would deter
“virtually all hostile tender offers.”43 In rejecting this claim, the court emphasized
that there were “numerous methods to successfully launch a hostile tender offer,”
even with a poison pill in place.44 Specifically, the court noted that although a
poison pill may prevent a tender offer from closing, a determined bidder could
acquire shares up to the amount of the poison pill trigger and conduct a proxy
contest to remove the board and redeem the poison pill.45 Critically, Household
International did not have a classified board, and therefore the court did not need to
examine the effect of the combination of a poison pill and a classified board.
Grasping the significance of the availability of the proxy contest as a
legitimating feature of the rights plan, the appellants then claimed that the poison
pill limited the stockholders’ ability to conduct a proxy contest. The court
responded that, while a defensive measure that “fundamentally restrict[ed]” a
hostile bidder from being able to win a proxy fight would not be a proportionate
response, it concluded that the poison pill’s trigger of 20% had only a minimal
effect upon proxy contests.46 Finally, the court found that the use of the poison pill
would be subject to judicial review under the Unocal test, discussed in the next
section.47
rights certificates, other than the acquirer, to buy the acquirer’s common stock at a fifty
percent discount.” Thomas, supra note 1, at 511 (footnote omitted). The “flip-in” defense
against creeping acquisitions had not yet been developed.
40. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1349.
41. See id. at 1351–53. The Delaware Supreme Court held that under title 8, section 157
of the Delaware Corporate Code, the board had the express authority to issue rights to
purchase shares. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (2010). Furthermore, the court determined
that section 151 granted the board the broad authority to grant whatever rights and features it
so chooses to the rights issued under section 157. See id. § 151; Moran, 500 A.2d at 1351–
53. In addition, the Court decided that directors have additional authority to issue the poison
pill under section 141(a), which confers upon the board broad power to manage the
corporation’s “business and affairs.” See tit. 8, § 141(a); Moran, 500 A.2d at 1353.
42. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1354–55.
45. See id. at 1354.
46. Id. at 1355 (citing Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1080 (Del. Ch.
1985)). Furthermore, the Chancery Court agreed with expert testimony that found that
hostile bidders holding less than 10% of a target corporation’s stock were successful in
gaining corporate control through a proxy contest or by threatening to hold one. Id. The
Court of Chancery further found that the poison pill “d[id] not limit the voting power of
individual shares,” id. (quoting Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d at 1080), and the “key
variable in proxy contest success is the merit of an insurgent’s issues, not the size of his
holdings.” Id.
47. Id. at 1355–56. In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court announced a new test for
defensive tactics: (1) the board must show that it had reasonable grounds for believing that
there was a threat to the corporation; and (2) the board’s defensive response was reasonable
in relation to that threat. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–58
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In sum, the Moran court emphasized that proxy contests, as well as other
takeover strategies, were still available to any potential insurgent to gain control of
target companies with rights plans. It points out that the key issue “is whether the
restriction upon individuals or groups from first acquiring [the trigger level] of
shares before waging a proxy contest fundamentally restricts stockholders’ right to
conduct a proxy contest.”48 However, that same year, the Delaware courts
determined the parameters surrounding target companies’ use of the poison pill and
other defensive measures.
B. Unocal: Reviewing the Use of Defensive Measures
The next major development in the analysis of takeover defenses occurred in
Unocal.49 T. Boone Pickens, president and chairman of the board of Mesa
Petroleum and other related entities, then a corporate raider, but today better known
as a hedge fund activist, made a front-loaded cash tender offer of $54 per share to
obtain 51% control of Unocal.50 The remaining 49% of the shareholders would be
squeezed out and receive junk bonds for their Unocal shares.51 Unocal responded to
Pickens’s bid by conducting a self-tender at a premium price of $72 per share for
50% of its stock.52 The Unocal board specifically excluded Mesa from their offer.53
Faced with the defeat and potential losses on its investment in Unocal, Mesa filed
suit to temporarily restrain the Unocal board from excluding Mesa from the selftender.54
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the Unocal board had the authority to
“deal selectively with its stockholders, provided the directors have not acted out of
a sole or primary purpose to entrench themselves in office,”55 but they had the
burden of proof to make such a showing.56 The board could satisfy that burden “by
showing good faith and reasonable investigation.”57 The Unocal court found that
the company’s board met this burden,58 but recognized that satisfying it did little to
(Del. 1985).
48. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1355; see also Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1
A.3d 310, 333 (Del. Ch. 2010) (quoting Moran’s language).
49. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949.
50. Id. at 949 n.1, 956.
51. Id. While the junk bonds were purportedly worth the same as the first step cash bid,
junk bonds were highly speculative and worth less than the cash value of the front end of the
offer. Id.
52. Id. at 951.
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 954–56.
56. See id. at 955–56. In determining whether a board is acting primarily to entrench
itself, the court had previously required a board to fulfill an initial standard of proof test
before the business judgment rule would apply. In Cheff v. Mathes, the Delaware Supreme
Court held that the board must show that it had “reasonable grounds” to believe that a threat
to the corporation’s and shareholders’ interests existed. 199 A.2d 548, 554–55 (Del. 1964).
57. This test was earlier developed in Cheff. Cheff, 199 A.2d at 555. A board’s proof of
showing good faith and a reasonable investigation is “materially enhanced” if a majority of
the board is comprised of outside independent directors. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
58. The Unocal board consisted of a majority of outside directors, so the board’s actions
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ensure that the board’s actions were not primarily for entrenchment purposes.59
Thus, it went on to determine that the board’s defensive actions also “must be
reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”60
In order to satisfy this “reasonableness” prong, the board must analyze the
nature of the threat and its potential effect on the corporation in deciding what is a
reasonable response to that threat.61 In Unocal, the board found that the threat
posed by Mesa was a “two-tier coercive tender offer coupled with the threat of
greenmail” designed to “stampede” shareholders to tender in the first step (in order
to avoid the junk bonds) even if the price offered was wholly inadequate.62 The
court held that Mesa’s tender offer posed a significant threat to the shareholders
and thus the board’s self-tender excluding Mesa was reasonable in relation to that
threat.63
The Unocal standard of review applies to any defensive action taken by a board
in response to an immediate or potential threat to the corporation, and in particular
to a board’s decision to use a poison pill to defeat an unwanted takeover bid for the
company. The court endorsed a two-part test in assessing defensive tactics: (1) the
board must show that it had reasonable grounds for believing that there was a threat
to the corporation; and (2) the board’s defensive response was reasonable in
relation to that threat.64 Combined with Moran, these two cases imply that target
company boards must leave open some avenue for an unsolicited change of control
transaction: if they close down the tender offer using the pill, they must leave open
an avenue for a proxy contest. As we show in the next two sections though, the
opportunity for such proxy fights seemed to shrink substantially.
C. Unitrin: Judicial Gloss on the Unocal Test
The Delaware Supreme Court revisited the Moran and Unocal decisions in
Unitrin Inc. v. American General Corp.65 In Unitrin, American General made an
unsolicited merger proposal to Unitrin, which responded by installing a poison pill
and implementing a stock repurchase program for roughly 20% of its stock.66
American General filed suit seeking to enjoin Unitrin’s use of the poison pill and
its repurchase program under Unocal.
Applying Unocal, the court found that the Unitrin board had conducted a
reasonable investigation in good faith of American General’s offer and identified
two threats that it posed to the corporate enterprise: (1) inadequate price; and (2)
antitrust complications.67 In reviewing the use of a repurchase plan in combination
were materially enhanced. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 957–58. Furthermore, the board, using the
advice of its legal and financial advisors, had reasonably investigated and concluded that
Mesa’s front-loaded tender offer was coercive and was inadequate in price. Id. at 956.
59. Id. at 955–56.
60. Id. at 955.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 956.
63. Id. at 949.
64. See id.
65. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
66. Id. at 1370.
67. Id.
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with a supermajority vote requirement (if a shareholder with 15% or more of the
stock sought a merger), the court expounded upon the Unocal second step by
explaining that first, there must be a “determination of whether a defensive
response was draconian because it was either coercive or preclusive in character”;
and second, if the response is not found to be draconian, it must be within a “range
of reasonableness.”68 The second step of Unocal was now comprised of two
separate components.
On the facts of the case, the court needed to decide when a defensive measure is
preclusive in the context of a proxy contest. Reexamining Moran, the court held
that a defensive action (including a rights plan) will be considered to preclude a
proxy contest only if the proxy contest is rendered either “mathematically
impossible or realistically unattainable.”69 In applying this preclusion test in
Unitrin, the court conducted a detailed examination of the likelihood of American
General being able to win a proxy contest. 70 The court found that if there were a
90% shareholder turnout in the proxy contest, then American General would need
only 45.1% of Unitrin’s stock.71 Furthermore, 42% of Unitrin’s shares were owned
by institutional investors (with 33% of Unitrin owned by only twenty
institutions).72 Thus, the court held that winning a proxy contest was not
“mathematically impossible or realistically unattainable” because American
General could make its case to the voters by, among other things, offering a high
enough price to sway these institutional investors to vote in favor of American
General.73 The court went on to remand the case to the Chancery Court to
determine if the stock repurchase fell within the range of reasonableness.74 It
instructed that court to consider whether: the stock repurchase was statutorily
authorized; it corresponded in degree to the size of the threat posed by American
General’s offer; and it treated all shareholders equally.75

68. Id. at 1387–88.
69. Id. at 1389. Thus, as Professor Gilson has observed, “under Unitrin, refusal to
redeem the pill is not preclusive under Unocal unless a proxy fight is also precluded.”
Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 491, 501 (2001).
70. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1381. First, the court recognized that proxy contests never have
100% of shareholder participation. Id. at 1381. Second, the court ruled that not only would
owning 15% of Unitrin (in order to avoid the supermajority vote provision) not be necessary
for American General to win a proxy contest, but it would be illogical because it would
trigger the poison pill as well as the constraints of title 8, section 203 of the Delaware
Corporate Code. Id. at 1381–82 (noting that section 203 places restraints on the acquisition
of a corporation by an “interested stockholder,” which is a stockholder that owns 15% or
more of a corporation).
71. Id. at 1382. American General could acquire 14.9% of Unitrin stock without
triggering the poison pill or supermajority vote provision and would only need an additional
30.2% of Unitrin stock to vote in favor of American General’s board slate to win a proxy
contest (thereby obtaining 45.1% of the vote) and only 35.2% to obtain 50.1% of the vote in
order to approve the merger. Id. at 1382–83.
72. Id. at 1382.
73. Id. at 1383.
74. Id. at 1389.
75. Id.
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Unitrin’s new definition of preclusion appears to modify Moran’s
“fundamentally restricts the chances of winning a proxy contest” test for when a
rights plan should be struck down under the Unocal doctrine. After Unitrin, courts
will only deem a proxy contest to be precluded if proxy-contest success is deemed
to be “mathematically impossible or realistically unattainable.”76 However, the
court did not attempt to reconcile this language with its earlier holding in Moran,
nor did it tell the lower courts which one of these two phrases—“mathematically
impossible” or “realistically unattainable”—it meant for them to apply.
As time passed, the Delaware courts developed an ad hoc system of policing
pills with different courts using different approaches.77 The uncertainty over which
standard should be applied became apparent in the Chancery Court’s opinion in
Selectica when the court was called upon to decide the legitimacy of the newly
created NOL rights plan. In the next Part, we will examine that opinion.
II. SELECTICA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
A. The NOL Pill: A Legal Innovation
In recent years, many unprofitable corporations have adopted so-called NOL
poison pills.78 This new form of rights plan is designed to protect these firms’
NOLs against the possibility that share-ownership changes might cause the
company to lose or limit its ability to use its NOLs to reduce its future tax
liabilities.79 NOLs are contingent assets whose value will be realized if the firm
reports a future profit within the twenty-year lifetime of the NOL.80 Because NOLs
have potential value until their expiration, even a nearly insolvent firm can hope
that at some point in the future it will return to profitability and be able to use its
NOLs.81
For purposes of this Article, the most important feature of the NOL poison pill is
that its trigger level is set at 4.99%,82 well below the level that has been historically
used in rights plans and the level approved in Moran. The reasons for this low
threshold are complex and deeply embedded in section 382 of the Internal Revenue

76. Id.
77. Thus, the Chancery Court struck down the dead hand pill in Carmody v. Toll
Brothers., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1195 (Del. Ch. 1998) (finding it preclusive and coercive
under Unocal standard), and the slow hand pill in Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn
Design Systems, Inc., 728 A.2d 25, 52 (Del. Ch. 1998) (violation of target board’s Unocal
duties), aff’d, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998), but on different grounds than those used by the
Delware Supreme Court in Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 721
A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998) (violation of § 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation
Law).
78. Merle Erickson & Shane Heitzman, NOL Poison Pills: Selectica v. Versata, 127
TAX NOTES 1303, 1369 (2010).
79. Id. at 1370.
80. Id.
81. See Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enters., Inc., No. 4241-VCN, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS
39, at *3 (Mar. 1, 2010), aff’d, 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010).
82. See Lesson from Selectica, supra note 23, at 1 and accompanying text.
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Code, the current tax law concerning the transfer of NOLs between companies.83
Without attempting to explain fully these tax code details, they essentially provide
that if a corporation experiences an “ownership change” for tax purposes,84 it may
be limited in its ability to use its NOLs in the postchange period. The validity of the
NOL poison pill was the central issue in Selectica.85
B. Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enterprises, Inc.
Selectica, a microcap company that had been losing money for several years,
had amassed NOLs that greatly dwarfed its market capitalization.86 Most of its
value was therefore attributable to the NOLs. Consequently, the Selectica board
began exploring the possibility of selling the company to utilize the NOLs, hiring
an investment banker to solicit potential buyers.87 Trilogy, a competitor of
Selectica, made a bid to acquire it.88 Although its bid was rejected, Trilogy
purchased a substantial amount of Selectica stock, subsequently disclosing it held
more than 5% of Selectica’s outstanding stock.89 Selectica’s advisors warned that
Selectica could lose most of its NOLs if Trilogy continued purchasing its stock, so
to preserve the value of the NOLs for Selectica’s stockholders, the board adopted
an NOL pill.90
Trilogy continued acquiring Selectica stock, purposefully triggering the pill.91
The Selectica board concluded that its NOL pill had been triggered and
implemented the exchange of rights called for therein,92 diluting Trilogy’s stock

83. For an overview of these issues, see Selectica, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 39, at *4–5.
84. This is defined as an increase in the percentage of stock ownership by one or more
5% stockholders to more than 50% over the lowest percentage of stock held by those owners
over a prior three-year period, or if more recent, since the date of the last ownership change.
Id. at *4.
85. Id.
86. Selectica had accumulated roughly $160 million worth of NOLs while its market
capitalization was roughly only $23 million. From 2006 to 2008, a few studies were
conducted by either Selectica or large shareholders of Selectica to determine the exact value
of the NOLs. Id.
87. Id. at *16.
88. Id. at *18–19.
89. Id. at *20.
90. Id. at *27. Furthermore, the Selectica board created a special committee to
periodically review the poison pill and “‘determine whether the Rights Agreement [poison
pill] continues to be in the best interest of the Corporation and its stockholders,’ as well as to
review ‘the appropriate trigger percentage’ of the pill.” Id. at *26.
91. Id. at *28.
92. Selectica decided to employ a share exchange (the “Exchange”) rather than using
the flip-in pill because of concern about the latter’s effect on the NOL analysis. Id. at *32–
33. The actual process for implementing the pill caused turmoil. Selectica had to freeze all
trading of its stock for roughly a month in order to issue the rights and the new stock. Id. at
*38.
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ownership percentage from 6.7% to 3.3%.93 The board also put in place a new
poison pill with a trigger of 4.99% (the “Reloaded NOL Pill”).94 Litigation
ensued.95
1. The Chancery Court Decision
In reviewing Selectica’s NOL pill, the Exchange, and the Reloaded NOL Pill
under the first prong of the Unocal standard, the Chancery Court concluded that
Selectica had reasonable grounds to conclude there was a threat to the corporate
enterprise.96 A threat could exist even if an acquirer accumulated only 5% of the
target’s stock because “a pill designed to protect NOLs necessitates precluding a
lesser accumulation of shares than might be appropriate for a pill designed to
prevent a hostile acquirer from establishing a control position in the company.”97
The Chancery Court was satisfied that the NOLs had potential value and that
Trilogy posed a serious threat to that value.98
With the first prong of Unocal satisfied, the court turned to whether the NOL
Pill, the Exchange, and the Reloaded NOL Pill were preclusive. First, Trilogy
argued that the NOL Pill and the Reloaded NOL Pill were preclusive because the
pills would prevent an insurgent “from signaling its financial commitment to the
company sufficient to establish such credibility.”99 Second, Trilogy claimed that
because Selectica had a staggered board, an insurgent would have to win two proxy
contests in order to gain control, exacerbating the insurgent’s difficulty of winning
even one proxy contest with less than 5% ownership.100 Finally, Trilogy explained
that a 4.99% cap would increase the free-rider problem in proxy contests, denying
an insurgent most of the potential benefits from a takeover.101
In response to Trilogy’s arguments, Selectica identified fifty public companies
that have implemented similar NOL pills with a 5% trigger.102 It offered expert
testimony that over a three-year period, out of fifteen proxy contests that occurred
in microcap companies where the insurgent held less than 5.49% of the shares, the
insurgent had been successful in obtaining at least one board seat in ten of those

93. Selectica did not actually implement the pill as written in the Rights Agreement.
Instead of issuing ten times more stock to all shareholders except Trilogy, Selectica chose to
only use a 2:1 ratio. Id.
94. Id. at *36–38.
95. Id. at *38–39.
96. Id. at *51–52. The court recognized the distinctiveness of this case stating, “[t]his
case presents unique grounds for establishing this first part of the Unocal test as employing a
poison pill for the ostensible purpose of protecting NOLs is a distinct departure from the
poison pill’s originally intended use: the prevention of hostile takeovers.” Id. at *52.
97. Id. at *53 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at *55.
99. Id. at *75.
100. Id.
101. Id. at *76.
102. Id. at *78.
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contests.103 It also argued that with only twenty-two investors owning 62% of
Selectica’s stock, a proxy contest would be relatively inexpensive.104
In evaluating the competing arguments, the Chancery Court needed to decide
which one of the three tests for preclusion set forth in Unitrin and Moran to
apply—“mathematically
impossible,”
“realistically
unattainable,”
or
“fundamentally restricts.” It decided to use the “mathematically impossible” test
saying, “It is not enough that a defensive measure would make proxy contests more
difficult—even considerably more difficult. [Rather] [t]o find a measure
preclusive . . . the measure must render a successful proxy contest a near
impossibility or else utterly moot, given the specific facts at hand.”105 In doing so,
it rejected Unitrin’s “realistically unattainable” second standard and neglected to
even mention the “fundamentally restricts” test taken from Moran. It did point out
that “mathematically impossible” was almost never satisfied, stating, “Though
Trilogy’s expert testimony suggests that a poison pill with a less than 5% trigger
‘has a substantial preclusive effect,’ the Court cannot conclude that the NOL Pill,
Exchange, and Reloaded NOL Pill were preclusive . . . . Such a high standard
operates to exclude only the most egregious defensive responses.”106 Based on the
“mathematically impossible” standard, however, the Chancery Court had no
question that the NOL Pill, the Exchange, and the Reloaded NOL Pill were not
preclusive, and ultimately not outside the range of reasonableness.107
2. The Supreme Court Decision
A few months later, in a well-written, tightly drawn opinion, the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court’s decision.108 The court had little
trouble finding that the NOL pill should be permitted under the specific facts of the
case under the familiar two-part Unocal test—step one requiring the board to show
it had in good faith, and after reasonable investigation, concluded that Trilogy’s
stock purchases posed a threat to Selectica’s corporate enterprise, and step two
determining whether the defense adopted was reasonable in relation to the threat
posed. Importantly for our purposes, the supreme court accepted the same expert
testimony that had been introduced in the lower court and reached a similar
conclusion that the NOL pill was not preclusive.109
In its analysis of the reasonableness of the board’s actions, the supreme court
was careful to show how Trilogy had precipitated the triggering of the poison pill
through its aggressive actions, while Selectica made serious efforts to avoid having

103. Id. at *79.
104. Id. at *79 & n.187.
105. See id. at *81 (footnote omitted). In support of this assertion, the court noted that in
Unitrin, the Delaware Supreme Court had stated that “[t]he key variable in a proxy context
would be the merit of [the challenger’s] issues, not the size of its stockholdings.” Id. at *82
n.189 (quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1383 (Del. 1995)).
106. See id. at *80–81 (footnote omitted).
107. Id. at *93.
108. Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 608 (Del. 2010).
109. Id. at 599–603.
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to use the defense.110 Moreover, the court noted that Trilogy was “a competitor, a
creditor, and a stockholder of Selectica,” which gave it an incentive to inflict
damage on Selectica by forcing it to deploy its poison pill.111 Given the events that
occurred, the court accepted without question the need for Selectica to put in a
second, “reloaded” poison pill that would serve as a deterrent to further purchases
by Trilogy.112 Overall, the court had no trouble upholding these measures as
reasonable in relation to the threat posed by Trilogy under the Unocal test.
While the supreme court affirmed the Chancery Court in its entirety, three
important new points came out of its opinion. First, the court clarified the meaning
of preclusion for defensive tactics under Delaware law by stating: “Because the
‘mathematically impossible’ formulation in Unitrin is subsumed within the
category of preclusivity described as ‘realistically unattainable,’ there is,
analytically speaking, only one test of preclusivity: ‘realistically unattainable.’”113
As discussed below,114 this will undoubtedly help the chancery court to better
determine which defensive tactics are preclusive.
Second, and very surprisingly given the facts of the case, the supreme court
went out of its way to “hold that the combination of a classified board and a Rights
Plan do not constitute a preclusive defense.”115 Trilogy had argued that Selectica’s
classified board and NOL poison pill required a challenger to launch and complete
two proxy contests in order to change control, and this made success “realistically
unattainable.”116 In rejecting this claim, the supreme court pointed out that nothing
in Delaware jurisprudence requires that bidders be permitted to gain control of a
target in one election,117 and that the delay imposed by a classified board did not
prevent a determined acquirer from gaining control of a target via two proxy
contests over a two-year period.118 However, the supreme court failed to
acknowledge that recent scholarship exists that suggests the combination of the two

110. Id. at 605.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 606.
113. Id. at 601. This formulation was subsequently reaffirmed by the chancellor in his
opinion in Air Products & Chems, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 113 n.435 (Del. Ch.
2011).
114. See infra pages 17–19.
115. Versata Enters., Inc., 5 A.3d at 604. Although the court plainly intended its
language to be read as a holding, in the footnote attached to the end of the quoted statement,
the court goes on to explain that Selectica “no longer” had a classified board because it
amended its charter after the trial to eliminate it. Id. at 604 n.41. Thus, the presence of the
classified board was not at issue in the case, and the court had no need to decide this point.
Id. However, the chancellor’s subsequent opinion in the Air Products case, where the
presence of a classified board was crucial to the outcome of the takeover battle, makes it
clear that the Delaware courts have decided that the combination of a rights plan and a
classified board is not preclusive. See Air Products, 16 A.3d at 115.
116. Versata Enters., Inc., 5 A.3d at 604.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 604 (citing Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1186 n.17 (Del. Ch.
1998)).
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defenses may be a showstopper,119 nor did it engage in any detailed analysis of the
likely effects of the classified board and NOL pill in a proxy contest for Selectica.
Finally, the supreme court stated that its decision “should not be construed as
generally approving the reasonableness of a 4.99% trigger in the Rights Plan of a
corporation with or without NOLs.”120 The decision emphasized that “the specific
nature of the threat [is what] ‘sets the parameters for the range of permissible
defensive tactics’ at any given time.”121 The threat of a longtime competitor
seeking to increase its stock ownership in order to intentionally impair NOL assets
of the target was a very serious threat to the corporation,122 which permitted the
Board to put in place a very serious defensive tactic: a 5% poison pill. Other threats
of a less menacing nature might not warrant such a low trigger level on a poison
pill, and even “non-preclusive, non-coercive defensive measure[s can be]
nonetheless unreasonable in light of the threat faced by the corporation.”123 We turn
next to the implications of the decision.
C. Some Implications of Selectica
1. The Meaning of Preclusion
Each of these three key aspects of the supreme court’s decision—the meaning of
preclusion, how classified boards should be analyzed under the preclusion test, and
how preclusion in a proxy contest is proved—has interesting implications. First,
although the supreme court’s decision clarified that “there is, analytically speaking,
only one test of preclusivity: ‘realistically unattainable,’” it did little to explain how
to reconcile this holding with the court’s prior precedent in Moran.124 In other
words, by stating that the “realistically unattainable” test for preclusivity is the test
to be applied, what signal is the supreme court sending to the Chancery Court about
what it views as a preclusive defensive tactic?
On the one hand, the supreme court’s test in Selectica is less onerous than the
one applied by the Chancery Court in the decision below, which asked whether
such success was “a near impossibility or else utterly moot.”125 On the other hand,
the Delaware courts’ frequent and favorable citations to Moran’s “fundamentally
restricts” test seemingly point to an even more dissident-friendly standard. For

119. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 35. In Yucaipa., the Chancery Court did consider
such evidence, but still concluded that “the combination of a classified board and a rights
plan are hardly show-stoppers in a vibrant American M&A market.” 1 A.3d 310, 347 (Del.
Ch. 2010), aff’d, 15 A.3d 218 (Del. 2011).
120. Selectica, 5 A.3d at 607.
121. Id. (quoting Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1384). This is consistent with Chancellor
Chandler’s Air Products decision where he upheld the combination of the poison pill and
classified board as used in that particular case but went on to state that a board cannot “‘just
say never’” to a takeover bid. Air Products, 16 A.3d at 129.
122. Selectica, 5 A.3d at 607–08.
123. Yucaipa, 1 A.3d at 337.
124. Selectica, 5 A.3d at 601.
125. Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enters., Inc., No. 4241-VCN, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 39, at
*4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 2010).
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instance, in Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc.,126 then-Chancellor Allen interpreted
Moran’s “fundamentally restricted” language as follows: “The thrust of the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Moran was simply that the restrictions imposed by
the stock rights plan on a proxy contest were immaterial to conducting a proxy
fight effectively.”127 In other words, Allen’s formulation is that Moran prohibits
defensive tactics that have a “material effect” on the likelihood of dissident success.
This is a far cry from Selectica on its face.
More recently, in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.128 (decided after the
Unitrin decision), the Delaware Supreme Court stated that a defensive tactic is
preclusive “if it deprives stockholders of the right to receive all tender offers or
precludes a bidder from seeking control by fundamentally restricting proxy
contests or otherwise.”129 Omnicare is thus apparently endorsing a looser standard
than Unitrin.
Is Selectica also endorsing the Moran test? This seems to be the case when the
court approvingly included a lengthy quotation from Moran, in which the Moran
court “rejected the contention ‘that the Rights Plan strips stockholders of their
rights to receive tender offers, and that the Rights Plan fundamentally restricts
proxy contests.’”130 In its earlier decision in Unitrin, the court also used both the
“fundamentally restrict[s]” language of Moran,131 and two pages later the
“mathematically impossible or realistically unattainable” test.132 Yet, the supreme
court did not clarify whether they are equivalent tests.
Importantly, at least one very recent Chancery Court decision has interpreted
Unitrin and Moran as creating the same standard for preclusion. In Yucaipa
American Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio,133 Vice Chancellor Strine measured the
legitimacy of the rights plan at issue in the case under Moran’s “fundamentally
restricts” test,134 while also discussing how Moran informed Unitrin’s test for
preclusion.135 He opined that “[w]hen a pill both prevents a tender offer and
unfairly tilts the electoral playing field against an insurgent, this court, to be true to

126. 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 121 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 1990).
127. Id. at *19–20.
128. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
129. Id. at 935 (emphasis added).
130. Selectica, 5 A.3d at 604 (quoting Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346,
1357 (Del. 1985)).
131. Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387 (Del. 1995) (citing
Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357).
132. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1389.
133. 1 A.3d 310 (Del. Ch. 2010).
134. Id. at 359. There he stated that the defendant company, Barnes & Noble, “has
convinced me that [its] Rights Plan is not an unreasonable device that ‘fundamentally
restricts’ Yucaipa [the dissident shareholder] from winning a proxy contest.” Id. (quoting
Moran, 500 A.2d at 1355).
135. Yucaipa, 1 A.3d at 336 (“Precisely because Moran’s approval of the pill was
premised on the ability to get around the pill through a proxy contest, Unitrin recognized the
importance of examining whether the company’s defensive arsenal as a whole, including the
pill, was preclusive in the precise sense of making it unrealistic for an insurgent to win a
proxy contest.” (citing Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387)).
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Moran, should not hesitate to enjoin its operation.”136 He further stated that “if a
defensive measure does not leave a proxy insurgent with a fair chance for victory,
the mere fact that the insurgent might have some slight possibility of victory does
not render the measure immune from judicial proscription as preclusive.”137 Where
a pill has the effect of making an election victory unlikely for a dissident, “the
proportionality prong of the Unocal test should require the board to make an
extremely strong showing why the rights plan should be sustained.”138 On the facts
of Yucaipa, however, the Vice Chancellor upheld the rights plan because it left the
dissident shareholder with “the ability to run a successful proxy contest to obtain
board representation.”139 Then-Chancellor Chandler seemed to pick up this theme
in Air Products when he stated:
The fact that something might be a theoretical possibility does not
make it “realistically attainable.” In other words, what the Supreme
Court in Unitrin and Selectica meant by “realistically attainable” must
be something more than a mere “mathematical possibility” or
“hypothetically conceivable chance” of circumventing a poison pill.
One would think a sensible understanding of the phrase would be that
an insurgent has a reasonably meaningful or real world shot at securing
the support of enough stockholders to change the target board's
composition and remove the obstructing defenses.140
The supreme court did not, however, mention Yucaipa in its decision in
Selectica, and its silence casts doubt on its willingness to do so.
Thus, despite the fact that the supreme court appears to be attempting to clarify
the test for preclusivity in its Selectica opinion, the meaning of the test and its
interaction with prior precedent is still unclear.141

136. Yucaipa, 1 A.3d at 337.
137. Id. at 337 n.182.
138. Id. Later in the opinion, the vice-chancellor states that in determining proportionality
under Unocal, “the key issue is whether the Rights Plan unreasonably inhibits the ability of
Yucaipa to run an effective proxy contest.” Id. at 353.
139. Id. at 360; see also id. at 331 (poison pill cannot preclude dissident “from waging an
effective proxy contest”); id. at 335 (trigger level must be at “such a reasonable threshold
that the owner of a bloc up to the trigger level can effectively run a proxy contest”).
140. Air Products & Chems, Inc., v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 116 (Del. Ch. 2011) (citing
Yucaipa, 1 A.3d at 337 n.182).
141. Chancellor Chandler in Air Products concluded that Delaware law
would be more credible if the Supreme Court acknowledged that its later
rulings have modified Moran and have allowed a board acting in good faith
(and with a reasonable basis for believing that a tender offer is inadequate) to
remit the bidder to the election process as its only recourse. The tender offer is
in fact precluded and the only bypass of the pill is electing a new board.
16 A.3d at 122 n.480. While this is certainly a reasonable interpretation of existing Delaware
precedent, we believe that the supreme court may wish to clarify its intentions on this issue
to make clear that it does not intend to allow preclusive defenses to tender offers. For
example, the supreme court may be willing to order redemption of the poison pill in the
scenario posed in Yucaipa (and quoted in Air Products) where the target’s classified board
and poison pill force a determined hostile bidder to take all of the various economic risks
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2. Classified Boards and Preclusion
In Selectica, the supreme court issued a blanket holding: a classified board and a
poison pill are not preclusive as they merely delay, but do not prevent, a dissident
from gaining control of the target company.142 In support of its conclusion the court
stated: “The fact that a combination of defensive measures makes it more difficult
for an acquirer to obtain control of a board does not make such measures
realistically unattainable, i.e., preclusive.”143 Yet, in order to determine whether a
defensive measure is preclusive, Selectica and Unitrin direct judges to determine if
the defensive tactic makes it more difficult for the dissident to “gain control” of the
target.144 Thus, the court seems to be making a judicial finding for all classified
boards that the increased difficulty for bidders associated with the classified board
(in combination with a rights plan) is not sufficient to make dissident success
realistically unattainable.
If this is the case, one wonders what evidence the court considered in making
this determination. Furthermore, why did it do so in a case where the issue had
been mooted by factual developments in the case,145 thus making it unnecessary to
resolve the question? One possible justification is that the court perceived a direct
threat to the classified board’s status as a valid takeover defense under Delaware
law. To understand this point, recall that the invention of the poison pill, and the
fact that a company without one can put one in place without shareholder approval
and on a moment’s notice, means that any company with a classified board can
immediately implement a poison pill.146 In order to preserve the utility of the
classified board, the court needed to find a way to affirm the use of the combination
of a pill and classified board in a takeover setting. This required the court to
consider the combination’s legitimacy under Unocal and, in particular, its
preclusive effects on proxy contests.
The court had to choose between adopting a general rule of nonpreclusivity, or
alternatively, conduct a case-by-case analysis of the preclusive effects of this
combination of defenses. If it decided to pursue the latter, then the issue would be
what a dissident shareholder would need to demonstrate in order to establish that
the combination was preclusive. In Moran and Unitrin, and elsewhere in Selectica,
the court actively weighed evidence about the likely effect of particular defensive
measures by considering expert testimony on the likelihood of dissident success in
the particular case. In fact, Vice Chancellor Strine in Yucaipa was careful to
consider empirical evidence on both sides of the issue when discussing the effects
of the combination of a poison pill and classified board, finding that it was not
likely to be preclusive given that success in the first proxy contest gives a dissident
great influence over the incumbent board, and that it is often unnecessary for the

associated with leaving a tender offer open for two years. Air Products, 16 A.3d at 128 n.510
(citing Yucaipa, 1 A.3d at 351 n.229).
142. See Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 604 (Del. 2010).
143. Id. (footnote omitted).
144. See id. at 601.
145. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
146. See Coates, supra note 20, at 288. In fact, a stand-alone classified board without a
poison pill is almost useless today as it does nothing to stop a hostile tender offer. See id.
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dissident to win two elections to gain control or force a sale to a third party.147
However, this analysis does not take into account the underlying share ownership
patterns of the target company, the likely recommendations of the third-party
voting advisors, or the costs of delay and uncertainty for a particular bidder that
seemed to be required—we argue below148—for a factual determination of the
likelihood of success in a proxy contest.
The virtue of the general rule of nonpreclusivity adopted by the court is that it
creates certainty.149 Certainty is a virtue for corporate planners and is valued by the
Delaware bench and bar.150 Moreover, it is true that—barring exceptional
circumstances, such as the presence of cumulative voting151—the classified board
by itself has no direct impact on a dissident shareholder’s chance of success in any
one contest. After all, the classified board merely reduces the number of candidates
that will be elected at the annual meeting and has no facial effect on how the votes
themselves are cast. 152
However, if we are to examine the classified board’s defensive effects on
strategic bidders that wish to gain control of the firm, we must look at the effects of
the temporal delay created by the classified board in combination with the poison
pill.153 This delay, which may add one or two additional years to the strategic

147. See Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 347 n.215 (Del. Ch.
2010) (citations omitted).
148. See infra Part III.A.
149. It presumably could be overcome if a dissident could find a way to show that the
peculiar features of a particular combination of a poison pill and classified board made
success in the initial proxy contest unrealistic, even without any consideration of the effects
of the negative impact for the bidder of potentially needing to bring a second proxy fight if
the first one was successful. In other words, the dissident would need to show that the
combination of defenses did more than delay victory—that it stopped them from winning
any proxy contest. This would not be the case with the current versions of those two
defenses.
150. See, e.g., Hariton v. Arco Elecs, Inc., 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963) (rejecting
application of de facto merger doctrine in Delaware because of the inherent uncertainty it
creates).
151. The combination of a classified board and cumulative voting can have an adverse
impact on a dissident’s ability to win all of the seats that are up for election in a proxy
contest. RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERINE T. DIXON, ARANOW AND EINHORN ON PROXY
CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL §10.07 (3d ed. 2001). However, cumulative voting is
an optional choice under state law, and is very rarely seen at public companies today. See
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 124, 165–66 (1994).
152. Furthermore, as we discuss in Part IV below, the classified board will have
relatively little effect on certain bidders, such as hedge funds, that only seek representation
on the board and do not intend to run a second proxy contest to gain control of the target
firm. This stems in part from Risk Metrics’s greater willingness to give dissidents a positive
voting recommendation in a representation contest rather than a control contest. See infra
Part IV for further discussion.
153. We remind the reader that virtually any company can put in a poison pill overnight,
so all firms have a shadow poison pill. This makes it vital to examine the effects of the
combination of these two defenses. In terms of the temporal effects of a combination of these
two defenses, they delay any hostile bidder’s efforts to obtain control of a target firm. In this
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bidders’ quest for control, will greatly increase the transaction costs associated with
a hostile bid and the risk of nonconsummation of the bid due to changes in market
conditions.154 Furthermore, if we ignore these costs for classified boards, does that
mean the court intends for us to also ignore similar effects generated by new,
innovative defenses that practitioners may design?155
A better way of thinking about the effect of the classified board is to include an
analysis of its impact on dissident success.156 Yucaipa points to one way that a
court could incorporate a general analysis of the combination of poison pill and
classified board on a dissident’s likelihood of success in a proxy contest, by
factoring in the likelihood of the target firm board consenting to a transaction after
an initial successful proxy fight, as well as its effect on a target board’s decision to
sell the firm to a white knight.157 As Vice Chancellor Strine noted in Yucaipa, these
values can be determined based on existing empirical research.158 We return to this
question in Parts III and IV where we discuss more fully how the effect of the
classified board might be considered by courts in subsequent cases.

sense, the classified board has a similar effect to the slow hand poison pill that the Delaware
courts have invalidated on other grounds. See, e.g., Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro,
721 A.2d 1281, 1293 (Del. 1998).
154. The classified board has to increase the costs of making a bid and/or reduce its
likelihood of completion if it is to be an effective defensive tactic. Gilson and Black make
this point eloquently in their classic case book on mergers and acquisitions: “A [hostile]
tender offer is made when the value to the acquiring company of the shares acquired exceeds
the price paid plus transactions costs. . . . Unless the [defensive] tactic in question can
change the value of one of the components of the formula in the appropriate direction . . . it
should have no effect on the acquiring company’s decision to proceed with the offer.”
RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS 790 (2d ed. 1995).
155. For example, the no-hand poison pill that delayed a new board’s ability to remove a
poison pill and consummate an acquisition was invalidated by now-Justice Jacobs on the
grounds that a six-month delay on any sale of the company was unreasonable under Unocal.
Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25, 47–51 (Del. Ch. 1998),
aff’d on other grounds, Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
156. A more textured analysis might also reduce the pressure that institutional investors
have put on corporate directors to allow shareholders to vote on removing classified boards.
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) reports that there have been record high levels of
shareholder support for shareholder proposals to declassify corporate boards, which it
attributes in part to “a trio of recent Delaware court decisions [that] upheld poison pills at
companies with classified boards.” ISS, PRELIMINARY 2011 U.S. POSTSEASON REPORT 6
(2011).
157. Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 347 n.215.
158. Id. In light of the supreme court’s decision in Selectica and then-Chancellor
Chandler’s decision in Air Products, we would anticipate that these values will change in the
future as boards of target firms with classified boards learn that they never need to accede to
hostile bidders’ (and their own shareholders’) demands to sell the company prior to a second
proxy contest. We further note that the effects of other combinations of defensive measures
can also be calculated using historical data.

2012]

SELECTICA RESETS THE POISON PILL TRIGGER

1109

3. Evidence on Stock Ownership and Proxy Contest Success
Finally, Selectica seems to require Delaware courts to engage in a textured
analysis of whether the dissident shareholder can realistically attain success in a
proxy contest. As we explain below, the court has scrutinized two types of
information in this regard: general information about dissident success in other
proxy contests that have some of the characteristics of the contest at issue in the
case,159 and the actual share ownership patterns and relationships between
shareholders in a particular case.160 Most frequently, the Delaware courts’ analysis
seems to focus on general evidence from other proxy fights. Recall that in Moran,
the court relied on expert testimony that insurgents owning less than 10% of the
stock of the target corporation had frequently succeeded in proxy contests to
uphold a 20% trigger in a flip-over pill.161 In Selectica, the Chancery Court pointed
to expert testimony that insurgents with up to 5.49% of target stock had been
successful in electing at least one director in more recent proxy contests.162 In that
case, the court accepted Selectica’s evidence that of fifteen proxy contests
involving microcap target corporations, the challenger successfully seated
nominees in ten contests.163 As Trilogy pointed out, the challengers did not gain
control in these contests where the target had a classified board.164 In fact, only five
of these cases involved targets with classified boards, and in these five cases, the
challenger needed to conduct a second proxy contest in order to gain control.165
Finally, the court pointed to the third-party voting advisor ISS’166 favorable voting
recommendations to its clients on some poison pills with less than 5% trigger
levels.167
In some cases, the court has gone further and explored the actual shareownership distribution of the target firm. In Unitrin, for example, the supreme court

159. Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 602 (Del. 2010).
160. Id. at 603.
161. Moran v. Household Int’l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1355 (Del. 1985).
162. Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enters., Inc., No. 4241-VCN, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 39, at
*79 (Del. Ch. March 1, 2010), aff’d 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010).
163. Id. at *79–81.
164. Id. at *79–80.
165. Id. at *79. More likely, these fifteen contests are being conducted by hedge fund
shareholder activists. This type of activist investor typically acquires relatively smallpercentage stakes in small or microcap firms, then runs short-slate contests in order to obtain
board representation rather than directly seeking control. See Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank
Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1748 (2008). The goal in these proxy contests is to influence
the board to adopt the activist investor’s proposed strategies, such as a sale of the firm or a
financial restructuring. There is good reason to believe that a 5% trigger will have little
effect on their efforts. Id. at 1774. This suggests that hedge fund activists may indirectly
benefit at the expense of strategic bidders from the Selectica decision, an inference that
seems supported by the fact that the largest block of Selectica’s stock was held by Steel
Partners, a prominent activist hedge fund which succeeded in defeating the takeover efforts
of a potential strategic bidder, Trilogy. We will return to this question in the next section.
166. ISS is the same organization as Risk Metrics.
167. Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 602–03 (Del. 2010).
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discussed the percentage of stock ownership by the Unitrin directors both before
(23%) and after (28%) the expected defensive stock repurchase took place.168 It
went on to state that a bidder with less than 15% of Unitrin’s stock (the maximum
permitted by its poison pill) “would need to amass only 45.1% of the votes
assuming a 90% voter turnout” and that “[t]he record reflects that institutional
investors own 42% of Unitrin’s shares” and that “[t]wenty institutions own 33% of
Unitrin’s shares.”169 After this discussion, the court concluded that the defensive
stock repurchase was not preclusive.170
Similarly, in the supreme court’s opinion in Selectica, the court noted that
“Selectica’s unique shareholder profile would considerably reduce the costs
associated with a proxy fight, since seven shareholders controlled 55% of
Selectica’s shares, and twenty-two shareholders controlled 62%.”171 The court
noted that Steel Partners, Director Sems, and Lloyd Miller owned 23.5% of the
company’s stock, and went on to calculate that an acquirer would be able to win a
proxy contest if it attracted the votes of nineteen shareholders that held 38.5% of
the company’s stock.172
Finally, Vice Chancellor Strine’s opinion in Yucaipa contains an extensive and
detailed discussion of the target company’s share distribution, the relationship
between two large dissident shareholders, and the size and importance of the
CEO’s large block of shares. Strine mentioned that Riggio, Barnes and Noble’s
CEO, held nearly 30% of its stock, while other insiders held another 3.26% and
corporate employees owned 6%,173 in the course of rejecting Yucaipa’s request to
find that the Barnes and Noble board violated Unocal by “not lifting the pill to
trigger at a level like 37%.”174 While the Vice Chancellor declined to do so for
several reasons, at least one of them was that Yucaipa might well join forces with
another large dissident shareholder, Aletheia, which held 17.44% of the stock, and
seek to gain control without paying a control premium.175 Strine then proceeded to
find that if voter turnout in a proxy contest was 91%, management would go into
the contest with 37% to 38% of the votes, but that Yucaipa could win the contest if
it got a supermajority of the remaining votes.176 Moreover, the court concluded that
ISS was much more likely to support an insurgent slate than a management slate,177

168. Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1377–78 (Del. 1995). The
court’s suggestion that the target firm directors might vote their 28% blocking position in
favor of the dissidents if the price was sufficiently high, id. at 1383, seems to conflict with
those same directors’ use of the poison pill to block the bidder from closing its tender offer.
It seems logical that if the offering price was high enough to lead the directors to want to sell
their shares, then there would be no need for the bidder to use the proxy contest to gain
control, as the directors would just redeem the rights plan and allow the tender offer to move
forward.
169. Id. at 1382.
170. Id. at 1389–90.
171. Selectica, 5 A.3d at 603.
172. Id. at 603 n.32.
173. Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 353 (Del. Ch. 2010).
174. Id. at 338.
175. Id. at 324.
176. Id. at 354.
177. Id. at 355.
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and such a recommendation generally had a favorable impact for dissidents.178
Finally, Strine pointed out that the poison pill’s 20% trigger level permitted
Yucaipa and Aletheia to each purchase up to 20% of the stock, thereby offsetting
any advantage that the Riggio bloc might otherwise have.179 As we show in Part III,
this type of careful and textured analysis is crucial if courts are going to make
realistic assessments of a dissident shareholder’s chances of winning a proxy
contest.
In sum, we have shown that, although the Delaware Supreme Court clarified the
test for preclusivity in its Selectica opinion, there remains more work to be done.
We further demonstrated that, in determining whether the combination of a
staggered board and a poison pill is preclusive, the court should weigh case-specific
evidence about its effect on the dissident’s ability to successfully conduct a proxy
contest for corporate control.
III. MODELING PRECLUSION UNDER UNOCAL
As mentioned previously, one of the key steps in judicial analysis of directors’
defensive actions under Unocal and subsequent Delaware jurisprudence is to
determine whether the defenses deployed by a target corporation are preclusive;
that is, do they make success in a proxy contest “realistically unattainable?”180 In
making this determination, a judge must assess the likelihood of dissident success
given the existence of the various defenses. Thus far, the courts have relied on ad
hoc discussions of individual target companies’ situations and piecemeal evidence
of success in other contests in making their determinations.181 In this Part, we
develop a model that can be applied to any company in order to assess the
likelihood that a defense is preclusive. Based on the facts considered in earlier
decisions, we isolate the salient aspects of corporate elections and incorporate them
into a weighted voting model that estimates the probability that different corporate
challengers will meet with success.182
We begin in Part A by identifying those aspects of the voting process that the
court has identified as relevant to the analysis of the takeover defense. We then
describe our model in Part B, showing how the items identified are incorporated
into it. Part C illustrates how the model can be employed in two typical situations—
a proxy contest coupled with a tender offer and a proxy contest in a corporation
with a staggered board. Finally, in Part D, we provide a short discussion of what
information courts would need to use our model and how courts might decide what
degree of likely success constitutes a “realistically unattainable” level.
A. Key Elements of the Basic Model
What are the salient characteristics of a corporation that are relevant to the
efficacy of a takeover defense? We focus on four factors that have been identified

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See id. at 357–58.
Id. at 356.
Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388–89 (Del. 1995).
See supra Part II.C.2–3.
The technical aspects of the model are discussed in the Appendix.
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in the cases: the existence (and trigger level) of a poison pill, the existence of a
staggered board, the distribution of shares among various constituencies,183 and the
opinion of third-party proxy voting advisors.184 These four factors are relatively
easy to measure and have been acknowledged as significant by the courts and
others in assessing the efficacy of a takeover defense.185
The poison pill is arguably the most important defensive measure available to
most corporations.186 In Moran, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized the
influence that a poison pill trigger level can have on a bidder’s prospects for a
successful electoral challenge for corporate control.187 In this regard, we must
incorporate the trigger level for the pill into the analysis as it limits the size of a
block that a dissident can accumulate. This may directly affect whether success in a
proxy contest is realistically unattainable.
In a similar vein, the existence of a staggered board has long been
acknowledged as a key takeover defense.188 As the court noted in Selectica, “[a]ny
classified board also operates as an antitakeover defense by preventing an insurgent
from obtaining control of the board in one election.”189 The existence of a classified
board requires that a challenger win two consecutive proxy contests in order to take
control of the board of directors. During this time period, much can happen as the
market for both companies involved in the potential transaction can shift rapidly.
The bidder will also incur substantial costs in keeping its bid open, which will
affect its ex ante calculations of whether to launch a bid in the first place.190
However, in our model, we focus solely on the fact that a classified board will, if
kept in place, force a determined bidder to win two elections rather than just a
single one.191
The distribution of shares among various constituencies is a third important
factor in assessing the likelihood that a challenge to the board will be successful.
Some of the reasons for this are obvious: if management has control of a large
number of shares (either because of direct ownership or indirectly through an
employee stock option plan (ESOP) or an arrangement with a white squire) they
will be less vulnerable. Conversely, if a dissident is prevented from a substantial
accumulation because of a poison pill, it will be less able to mount an attack. But

183. See, e.g., Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 603 (Del. 2010).
184. Id. at 602.
185. See supra Part II.C.2–3.
186. ROBERT F. BRUNER, APPLIED MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 837 (2004) (“The poison
pill is arguably one of the most significant financial innovations in recent decades and is
probably the single most effective defense in the target’s arsenal.”).
187. Thomas, supra note 1, at 519.
188. Bebchuk et al., supra note 35, at 924.
189. Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 604 (Del. 2010).
190. Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enters., Inc., No. 4241–VCN, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 39, at
*75 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 2010).
191. We will consider the other effects in our discussion of the range of reasonableness in
Part IV. Thus, for example, a target board of directors may stop trying to maintain the
company’s independence after losing an initial proxy contest and sell the company, either to
the bidder or a white knight. The court should take such a possibility into account in
deciding if the classified board “fundamentally restricts” shareholders’ ability to win a proxy
contest.
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there are other ways in which the distribution of shares can affect the likely success
of a dissident.
Shareholders’ interests are not homogeneous. Some are interested in long-term
returns, while others may be more concerned with short-run payoffs. These
differing interests will materially affect how each group votes in takeover contests.
Merger arbitrageurs, for example, are naturally more skeptical of takeover defenses
than many other shareholders.192 Some shareholders will have a bias toward
management if for no other reason than it lowers their transaction costs in deciding
how to cast their proxy. Any method that tries to assess the likelihood of
management winning a proxy battle must find a way to incorporate those biases
into its analysis.
Finally, third-party proxy advisors, such as ISS or Glass Lewis,193 can have an
effect on institutional investors’ voting patterns. Both the court and academic
commentary have recognized that the recommendation of a proxy advisor can have
a pivotal impact on the outcome of a vote.194 Proxy advisory firms make
recommendations to shareholders about how to vote their proxies in corporate
elections and proxy contests.195 The proxy advisory firms construct their
recommendations using a variety of inputs and analyze the merits of voting
proposals.196 Proxy advisors make case-by-case recommendations for individual
companies, based on the company’s specific situation.197 Institutional investors
overwhelming use the services of ISS and the other third-party voting advisors,
causing the recommendations to have an impact on the outcome in shareholder
voting contests.198 The size of this effect will vary across firms depending on the
degree of institutional ownership of their stock, but it can be significant.
Of course, in deciding whether the corporate structure is either unreasonable or
makes a successful proxy challenge realistically unattainable, we cannot a priori
make assumptions as to what a proxy advisor’s recommendation will be in any
given situation. We can, however, consider the two cases of a pro-management

192. Merger arbitrageurs take a long position in the target company’s stock and a short
position in the acquirer, betting that the merger will close and they will make a profit. Frank
Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and Financial Innovation, in NEW
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CHALLENGES 101,
125 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2007). As a result, they are gambling that the
merger will close and that any antitakeover defenses will be overcome.
193. For a concise history of ISS and Glass Lewis, see Alan Miller, Conducting a
Contested Stockholder Meeting, in MEETINGS OF STOCKHOLDERS 12-1, 12-20 to 12-21 (R.
Franklin Balotti, Jesse A. Finkelstein & Gregory P. Williams eds., 3d ed. Supp. 2011).
194. Selectica, 5 A.3d at 602; Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 355
(Del. Ch. 2010); see also Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections
and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 696–97 (2009); James Cotter, Alan
Palmiter & Randall Thomas, ISS Recommendations and Mutual Fund Voting on Proxy
Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2010); Cindy R. Alexander, Mark A. Chen, Duane J. Seppi &
Chester S. Spatt, The Role of Advisory Services in Proxy Voting (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 15143, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434658.
195. Cotter et al., supra note 194, at 6.
196. Id. at 7.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 24–26.
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recommendation or an anti-management recommendation, and compute the
likelihood of a successful challenge. If an anti-management recommendation still
results in a miniscule chance for a successful challenge, then there may well be
cause for concern that a challenge is realistically unattainable.
These four elements of corporate defenses and shareholder voting—pill trigger
level, staggered board, share distribution, and third-party advisors—have to be
assessed in order to decide if success in a proxy battle is realistically unattainable.
We turn next to building a model that allows that level of analysis.
B. The Basic Model
Our model is based on the theory of weighted voting.199 Unlike other formal
models of corporate voting,200 our model incorporates the key fact that investors
can control large blocks of stock and there is likely to be a correlation between how
they cast their votes. We will characterize the various shareholders in terms of the
size of their bias toward (or against) management and to the sensitivity of their vote
to the opinion of a third-party proxy advisor. This will help capture two of the
factors we have identified as significant to the analysis.
In our examples, we divide the corporation’s shareholders into six
constituencies: Management, Dissident, three different institutional groups
(Institution I, Institution II, and Institution III), and the Public.201 For each of these
groups, we make some baseline assumptions about their bias toward management
as well as how closely they follow a signal from a fixed third-party proxy
advisor.202 We assume that Management shares will always vote for management,
while Dissident shares will always vote for the dissident, and that these two groups
will each be insensitive to any signal from the advisor. We also assume that the
Public is essentially a “noise” term corresponding to a random vote.203 We are
assuming that the small percentage of shares held by individuals is as likely to be

199. See Part VI, the Technical Appendix, for details. Weighted voting attaches different
weights to different shareholders’ votes to reflect the fact that shareholders own different
size blocks of stock.
200. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Sales and Elections as Methods of
Transferring Corporate Control, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 783 (2001). For a critique, see Paul
H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Voting and the Takeover Debate, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 453, 489 (2005).
201. In any given application of this model, one might choose to divide these groups in
some different way. The model allows for more or fewer groups of shareholders.
202. The model can be adapted to allow for more than one third-party advisor if that is
deemed advisable.
203. For ease of presentation we will assume that all shares are voted. While not strictly
true it does not materially affect our analysis. Formally, one can view the share distributions
we use as the distribution among the shares that are voted. This would require some small
tweaking since, for example, a poison pill trigger of 20% would effectively be a somewhat
higher percentage of the voted shares. Our method is not sensitive to small perturbations of
this as we discuss in the Appendix. Furthermore, since we assume that the public shares are
randomly voted and those shares are the ones least likely to be voted, the probabilities we
compute are quite close to what one might get accounting for uncast shares.
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voted on one way as the other. In that sense how those ballots are cast contains no
information and hence act as “noise” in the final tally.
We classify the remaining share blocks (i.e., Institution I, II, and III) in terms of
how sensitive they are to a voting signal from a third-party advisor and what their
bias is toward supporting management. We assume that every share block is to
some extent influenced by the third-party signal,204 which seems imminently
reasonable since many of the proxy advisors publish their recommendations and
institutional investors usually subscribe to such services.205 But some blocks will
more closely follow the signal—say those that contract with the party for advice—
and others, while following the signal generally, are more likely to behave
independently (e.g., arbitrageurs and hedge funds). We will discuss these
assumptions further in the next section.
The other two factors identified in Part A—pill trigger level and classified
board—are also easily accommodated within our model. The size of the pill trigger
is used as an upper bound on the size of the block of shares held by the dissident.
The existence of a staggered board, and hence the requirement that a dissident win
two consecutive elections in order to take control of the board of directors, is
modeled by considering a two-stage election in which the dissident must win both
stages in order to be successful.
The output from the model will be a pair of probabilities. One will be the
probability that management wins, given a pro-management signal from the
advisor. The second is the probability that management wins, given an antimanagement signal from the advisor. In the context of analyzing takeover defenses,
we are most interested in the latter because it is the most likely indication that
management is attempting to entrench itself in power at shareholders’ expense.
C. Examples
In order to illustrate our argument while keeping the mathematics accessible to
the nontechnical reader,206 we will give two illustrations of our model. The first
example models a corporation in which management has control of a substantial
amount of stock, perhaps because of an ESOP,207 or alternatively from the use of a
white squire.208 In this illustration, we will also assume that the corporation has
installed a poison pill with a 15% trigger. In our second illustration, we will
consider a corporation with very small management holdings, but a staggered

204. Alternatively we might think that the blocks are positively correlated with the thirdparty signal.
205. Cotter et al., supra note 194, at 7.
206. The technically inclined reader should refer to the Appendix for further details.
207. An ESOP is an employee stock option plan. These are frequently used as defensive
devices in takeover battles as a way of shifting a block of votes to management’s side of the
table, and have been upheld by courts in most circumstances. Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v.
Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 290–91 (Del. Ch. 1989).
208. A white squire takeover defense places a significant block of target company voting
stock in the hands of a friendly third party to help management win in a takeover battle. Id. It
is sometimes used in conjunction with an ESOP to maximize its impact. Id.
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corporate board. In both of these illustrations, our goal is to estimate the a priori
likelihood that management will win a proxy contest.
1. Proxy Contest in a Corporation with an ESOP/White Squire
In this scenario, Management, perhaps either through an ESOP or through a
white squire, has control over a substantial percentage of the company’s stock.209
The dissident shareholder has purchased as much stock as possible under the rights
plan with a 15% trigger level.
As is common, we assume that individual shareholders own only a small
percentage of the shares, leaving the vast majority of the shares in the hands of
institutional shareholders.210 We divide the institutional shareholders into three
groups. We assume that the first group, Institution I, will follow the proxy advisor’s
recommendation. The second group, Institution II, will be biased toward
Management, but will be influenced by the advisor’s recommendation. The third
group, Institution III, will be more opposed to Management in takeover situations,
but still somewhat sensitive to the advisor’s recommendation.211
Scenario A: Management with Small Shareholdings and ESOP/White Squire
Management
Dissident

15%
15%

Institution I

17%

Institution II

23%

Institution III

24%

Public

6%

In this illustration, we will model the likelihood of success in a proxy contest for
control of the corporation. In a proxy contest for corporate control, both the
Management and the Dissidents run competing slates for the target company’s
board of directors. We will assume that there is no accompanying tender offer by
the Dissidents. Rather, the Dissidents are hoping to convince the shareholders that
they could do a superior job of running the company if they were elected. Prior
evidence indicates that shareholders are more likely to vote in favor of Dissidents
in a proxy contest for control than in a routine uncontested director election, but
they are less likely to do so than in a takeover contest with an accompanying tender
offer.212

209. As an example of this situation, consider Polaroid’s battle for independence from
Disney. See id. at 279–80.
210. This is typically the case in most large American public corporations, as courts have
observed in particular cases. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361
(Del. 1995). These institutions are also more likely to vote, to vote against management
proposals, and to vote in favor of proposals put forward by other investors. Id. at 1382.
211. We discuss how these assumptions are incorporated into the model in the Appendix.
212. For a summary of evidence, see THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 151, at § 1.03. We
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Under these conditions, our model indicates that a pro-management signal
results in Management winning 71% of the time. A pro-dissident signal results in
Management winning 34% of the time. We return to the question of whether these
numbers are indicative of realistically unattainable success for the Dissident in Part
III.D.2 below.
We can use the same model to examine the central issue in the Selectica case:
does a 5% trigger on the poison pill make a dissident’s likelihood of success in a
proxy contest “realistically unattainable”? To model this, we assume that the
Dissident’s holdings are capped at 5% and the remainder of the shares is distributed
proportionately among the various institutional shareholders. We assume the same
set of biases as before.
Under these assumptions, our model shows that the likelihood of a Management
win is exactly the same as when the pill trigger was set at 15%—so that the
Delaware courts’ conclusions in Selectica were correct, assuming that the target
firm there had a similar stock ownership pattern to the one we are modeling here.213
While counterintuitive at first glance, there is an intuitive explanation for this
result. If Management controls a significant block, then the Dissident’s success will
be dependent on convincing the institutional investors to vote against Management.
Since so much of the stock is held by institutions, and the vote of the institutions is
highly correlated, the actual amount held by the Dissident is not likely to be
dispositive of the outcome. 214 Thus, in this scenario, the actual ownership stake of
the Dissident has no direct effect on the outcome of the election.215
discuss how these assumptions are incorporated in the model in the Appendix.
213. That the dissident holds a smaller stake might well affect the outcome of the vote in
other ways. Suppose that a proxy advisor is more likely to give a pro-dissident signal if the
dissident holds a large stake than if it holds a small stake. This could be because the advisor
is skeptical of the seriousness of the challenge, or worries about the financial strength in the
former case. If we assume that the advisor gives a pro-management signal 50% of the time if
the dissident holds a 15% stake in the company and will give a pro-management signal 70%
if the dissident only holds a 5% stake, then under the assumptions in the model, management
wins 60% of the time under a small pill trigger and only 52% of the time with a 15% trigger.
For details, see Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Resetting the Trigger on the Poison
Pill: Selectica’s Unanticipated Consequences 47–48 (Vand. Univ. Law Sch. Law and Econ.,
Working Paper, No. 10-16, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1631941.
214. This illustrates the logic of the Selectica court’s citation to its earlier decision in
Unitrin that “[t]he key variable in a proxy contest would be the merit of the bidder’s
proposal and not the magnitude of its stockholdings.” Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc.,
5 A.3d 586, 603 (Del. 2010) (citing Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361,
1383 (Del. 1995)). To put it slightly differently, institutions’ votes track the value of the
proposed transaction in proxy contest for corporate control, and in Unitrin, the institutional
vote was decisive. However, in situations where the voters have an interest in preserving
their control of the company, such as managers, or even outside directors, courts should be
cautious in treating them as if they were otherwise disinterested shareholders. For instance,
in Unitrin, the court seemed to ignore this point when it claimed that the directors holding
27% of the company’s stock, and the ability to block a second step transaction in any
acquisition effort, would respond to a high enough offer price by voting in favor of the
bidder. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1383 (quoting testimony of one director that “everything has a
price parameter”).
215. We note that this result is dependent on the particular stock ownership pattern in the
target firm. Even a 15% trigger level could be preclusive if we alter the stock ownership
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2. Takeover Contest Using a Joint Tender Offer and Proxy Contest and Facing a
Staggered Board
In this second example, the target company management controls only a small
percentage of the shares. They have neither an ESOP in place nor a white squire.216
We again assume that the Dissident has purchased the maximum number of shares
permitted under the target company’s rights plan.
As in the previous scenario, we assume that individual investors own a small
stake and that most of the shares are in the hands of institutional investors. We use
the same description of these institutions as before, namely Institution I follows the
advisor’s recommendations, Institution II generally favors Management but is
sensitive to the advisor’s recommendation, and Institution III is generally opposed
to Management in takeover situations but is still influenced by the advisor’s
recommendations. For each of the scenarios mentioned above we will consider two
different types of contests.
Scenario B: Management with Small Shareholdings
Management
Dissident
Institution I
Institution II
Institution III
Public

3%
15%
16%
30%
30%
6%

In the joint tender offer and proxy contest, we assume that there is a pending
tender offer for the target company’s shares, that the offer is at a premium over the
market price,217 and that the poison pill prevents the bidder from buying a
controlling block of stock promptly with its offer. This forces the bidder to engage
in a proxy contest to replace the current board with one that will deactivate the pill,
allowing the bidder to buy a controlling interest. Because the Dissident has made a
tender offer, the appeal of his election platform is that it will buy the company if it
is successful. The prospect of a sale at a premium price is very attractive to most
investors, much more so than in the prior example, so we assume that the
shareholders will be more biased toward the Dissident than in the previous
situation.

patterns in ways that adversely affect the dissident’s chances of winning a proxy contest.
However, we believe that for most large cap, publicly traded firms, it is reasonable to assume
that a very high percentage of their stock is owned by institutional investors that are free to
vote their shares in a manner designed to maximize share value (and likely are legally
obligated to do so).
216. For a typical example of this scenario, see the situation in Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v.
Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1051 (Del. Ch. 1988).
217. See Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037,
1057–59 (2002) (discussing the joint tender offer and proxy contest for Williamette
Industries).
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To further complicate matters in this case, we assume that the company has a
staggered board in place and thus the Dissident will have to win two consecutive
proxy contests in order to place enough new members on the board to deactivate
the pill.218 In this circumstance, we assume that the shareholders will be more
biased toward the Dissident in the second election than in the first because the
Dissident has shown a strong commitment to gaining control of the company.219
To model this situation, we compute the probability of Management winning in
each of the elections separately. Then the overall likelihood of Management
winning is the probability that it wins at least one of the elections, since for the
Dissident to triumph he must win both. In this circumstance, our model has
Management winning 21% of the elections in which there is an anti-management
signal and 46% of the elections with a pro-management signal.
Contrast this with the outcome if there was no classified board and the Dissident
need only win one election. In that case our model has Management winning only
13% of the elections for which there is an anti-management signal and 30% of the
elections with a pro-management signal. So the effect of a staggered board is to
almost double the likelihood that Management will retain control in the least
favorable circumstances of an adverse recommendation from a proxy advisor. So
even when the Dissident is at his most advantaged, fighting a proxy contest
accompanied by a tender offer, the existence of a staggered board doubles the
likelihood of Management retaining control. This, combined with the additional
costs associated with sustaining a takeover bid over multiple years and the
additional risk of a change in market conditions, certainly lends evidence to the
claim that the combination of a staggered board with a poison pill is preclusive of a
successful proxy challenge.
D. Final Considerations
We close this Part by commenting on two aspects of our proposed model. The
first is the central role that information specific to the corporation and its defense
plays in the analysis. The second is the question of how we should quantify the
notion of “realistically unattainable.”
1. The Role of Information
In reading the Delaware cases on preclusion under Unocal, and in our model of
corporate elections, information about the shareholders and their biases play a
central role in assessing the preclusive effect of takeover defenses. To assess
whether a dissident has a realistically attainable chance of success requires an
understanding of who holds the shares, what their individual biases are, and what
the likely effect of third-party advisors will be. What this means, of course, is that a

218. For a discussion of the effect of classified boards on hostile takeovers, see Bebchuk
et al., supra note 35.
219. For the details of how we implement the model, see Part VI, the Technical
Appendix.
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set of defenses may be acceptable for one corporation but not for another, even if
they face the same threat. The distribution of shares alone could make a difference.
Are the courts capable of gathering the information that they will need to make
these kinds of assessments? We think so. There is already a large amount of
literature on the behavior of institutional investors in proxy contests,220 and there
recently has been a spate of work on third-party advisors as well.221 If the courts
indicate that they desire more detailed information on share-ownership patterns, no
doubt it will be provided by the parties in any litigation.222
We are aware that in his opinion in Airgas, Chancellor Chandler addressed
“[t]he real-world difficulty of a judge accurately assessing the ‘realistically
attainable’ factor.”223 He rejected the testimony of two highly qualified proxy
solicitors about the likelihood of Air Products, the dissident, being able to
successfully win a proxy contest at a special meeting with a 67% majority vote
requirement, calling them “unhelpful and unconvincing.”224 He did leave open the
possibility that this type of testimony might be useful if it was based on actual
discussions with shareholders about how they intended to vote at a meeting, and he
did accept the uncontested testimony that “it is easier to obtain investor support for
electing a minority insurgent slate than for a controlling slate of directors.”225
For our purposes, this suggests that a court might find the assumptions in our
model to be too theoretical for a judge to accept as trial testimony. As an
alternative, a judge could appoint an independent expert to assess the necessary
parameters for estimating our model.226 This expert could estimate the various
parameters necessary for estimating the likelihood of success in our model, or a
simpler rough-and-ready version of it. As an example of a simplified version of the
model, if there was only one type of institutional investor who holds 64% of the
stock, then management will win when the institutional investor votes in his favor.
In our model, we assume that a positive recommendation from the proxy advisor
results in a positive vote about 85% of the time. So, on average, we would expect a
pro-management vote 85% of the time. A better estimate would be to use a number
somewhat smaller than 85% since, by aggregating all of the institutional voters, we
have lowered the likely influence of the proxy advisor overall. In a similar way, a

220. See, e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate
Governance, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1135 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control:
The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991); Martin
Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial
Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187 (1991).
221. See Choi et al., supra note 194, at 696; Alexander et al., supra note 194, at 3; Cotter,
et al., supra note 194, at 25.
222. “If you build it, he will come.” FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal Studios 1989).
223. Air Products & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 116 (Del. Ch. 2011).
224. Id. at 117.
225. Id. at 120.
226. In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1222–23 (Del. 1992) (holding that
the Delaware Court of Chancery has inherent power to appoint an expert witness); DEL.
UNIF. R. EVID. 706 (court-appointed experts permitted).
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negative recommendation from the advisor results in a pro-management
management vote roughly 15% of the time.227
2. Threshold of Preclusion: How Unlikely Does Success Have To Be?
Given our ability to compute the probabilities with some level of confidence,
what likelihood of dissident success should be considered “realistically
unattainable”?228 At one extreme is the Chancery Court opinion in Selectica,
affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court, where the court seemed to say that even
the slightest chance of success was sufficient using one part of Unitrin’s language,
the “mathematically possible” portion of its standard. The supreme court did not
reject that determination expressly, although by collapsing Unitrin’s two-part test
into one “realistically unattainable” test it seems to have indicated that a higher
likelihood of success was necessary. At the other end of the spectrum, Vice
Chancellor Strine’s language in his Yucaipa opinion, drawing on Moran’s
“fundamentally restricts” standard, suggests a greater level of potential success is
needed, or a defensive measure may be found to be preclusive. Setting the proper
threshold obviously has important policy implications for the market for corporate
control: too high a threshold risks shutting the market down entirely, whereas too
low a level encourages too many challenges, which would raise transaction costs
with little benefit to the corporation.
Given the current ambiguity about this question, we think it important to try to
offer some factors that may assist courts in their task of reviewing defensive
tactics.229 First, at a theoretical level, we believe that in today’s highly competitive
world economy, we must take into account the economic consequences of the
market for corporate control on capital flows and the overall effects on economic
efficiency for the American economy. Economic efficiency considerations point

227. A second alternative would be to use historical data about proxy contest success to
estimate the effects of individual defenses or combinations of defensive measures. One of
the authors conducted such a study on the effects of poison pills in proxy contests. Randall S.
Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Impact of Rights Plans on Proxy Contests: Reevaluating
Moran v. Household International, 14 INT’L REV. OF L. & ECON. 327 (1994). While the
presence of the shadow pill made it impossible to detect any direct effect of poison pills on
the outcome of proxy contests, see Coates, supra note 20, Martin and Thomas found that any
defensive measure that restricted dissident stockholdings below 10% had a statistically
significant negative impact on the likelihood of dissident success in a proxy contest.
Academic research of this type, preferably conducted without reference to an ongoing case,
would give a judge grounds to find that a particular defense, or combination of defenses,
were preclusive.
228. See supra Part I.C.
229. As noted above, our analysis rests on an underlying assumption that historical
success rates are set at the “correct” or “efficient” level of success for the market for
corporate control. However, while we believe that the status quo is generally acceptable to
the Delaware judiciary, some scholars have disagreed. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
supra note 4 (advocating in favor of opening up the market for corporate control); Martin
Lipton, Twenty-Five Years After Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom: Old Battles, New
Attacks and the Continuing War, 60 BUS. LAW. 1369 (2005) (advocating for a more limited
market).
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toward facilitating bids that transfer resources into the hands of higher-valued
users. Typically, hostile offers by strategic bidders are priced at a substantial
premium over the existing stock market price of the company, with 30%–50%
premiums common.230 These buyers are going to own the entire company after an
acquisition and will be responsible for any losses that are incurred. If strategic
bidders are willing to pay such substantial premiums over existing market prices,
then this is one indication that a shift in control of the target firm may lead to an
improvement in overall economic efficiency. While we do not discount the
possibility that the stock market is inefficient in some ways at some points in
time,231 and that some acquisitions may not benefit, particular acquiring
companies,232 there is very strong evidence that most mergers and acquisitions do
result in direct benefits at least to the target company shareholders.233 Given that
the dominant model of the corporation in the United States and in American
corporate law claims that companies should be run by their directors for the benefit
of their shareholders, we think it follows that there is a strong argument that the
market for corporate control has an important place in our corporate governance
system. We note that this is consistent with what we have observed in the United
States for the past fifty years.
With that general background, we turn next to identifying factors that should
influence the courts’ view of what level of openness that should exist in proxy
contests. Proxy contests are an important feature of the market for corporate
control, especially since the invention of the poison pill and its dramatic effect on a
bidder’s ability to close a hostile tender offer. Historically, proxy contests have
featured about a 28% dissident victory rate in gaining majority control of the
board234 and roughly a 50% success rate in obtaining board seats overall.235
Potential bidders factor the likelihood of success into their calculations when
deciding if they should make a bid. These statistics suggest that bidders would use
a roughly 28%–50% average success rate in making their calculations. Yet, even if
we use only the majority control victory percentage, this suggests that the Delaware
courts should consider a 28% chance of success in a proxy contest as a reasonable

230. Gregor Andrade, Mark Mitchell & Erik Stafford, New Evidence and Perspectives on
Mergers, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 106 (2001).
231. See generally Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance,
in 1B HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1053 (George M. Constantinides, Milton
Harris & René M. Stulz eds., 2003); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 2 (2000); Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market
Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59, 60 (2003).
232. The classic article is Mark L. Mitchell & Kenneth Lehn, Do Bad Bidders Become
Good Targets?, 98 J. POL. ECON. 372 (1990), where the authors document, among other
things, that firms that overpay in acquisitions frequently become targets for other acquirers.
233. See generally Gregor Andrade, Mark Mitchell & Erik Stafford, New Evidence and
Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 103 (2001); Gregg A. Jarrell, James A.
Brickley & Jeffry M. Netter, The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence
Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49 (1988).
234. David Ikenberry & Josef Lakonishok, Corporate Governance Through the Proxy
Contest: Evidence and Implications, 66 J. BUS. 405, 413 (1993).
235. J. Harold Mulherin & Annette B. Poulsen, Proxy Contests and Corporate Change:
Implications for Shareholder Wealth, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 279, 289 (1998).
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approximation of what “realistically attainable” success means under the preclusion
determination in the second step of the Unocal test.236
Our analysis to this point has been concerned with the likelihood of success of a
generic dissident. But different types of bidders may create different amounts of
value. Thus, a strategic bidder that is bringing two companies in the same industry
together to compete more effectively against other firms may be creating a very
large amount of value, and be assuming all of the risks if things go badly, whereas
a hedge fund that is trying to implement a financial restructuring of the target firm
may lead to relatively less improvement in shareholder wealth. Private equity firms,
while sometimes criticized as targeting companies with artificially depressed stock
prices, and who rarely engage in hostile transactions, might fall somewhere in
between these two extremes.237
This suggests some variations in the underlying proxy contest success rate under
Unocal to take into account different types of bidders. If the court were to focus on
a single threshold value of success as being realistically unattainable, the effect
may be to advantage one kind of dissident over another. This could potentially lead
to favoring dissidents interested in wealth transfers over those that are engaged in
wealth creation. We would then be sacrificing some of the benefits of a robust
market for corporate control.
How should these considerations be incorporated into the court’s analysis? We
think that can be done by incorporating a detailed understanding of the institutional
actors into the range of reasonableness analysis in the second step of the Unocal
test, which we turn to now.
IV. ENHANCING THE ANALYSIS
Our basic voting model incorporates several key elements for a contextual
assessment of the efficacy of certain defensive tactics. It focuses on the distribution
of shares at a target company, on the trigger level of its poison pill, and on whether
it had a classified board. In this Part, we try to more completely specify the model
in order to permit a court to better see the effects of biases of various potential

236. Two caveats are in order here. First, a more refined analysis of historical data could
consider success rates for each different type of proxy contest, including joint tender
offer/proxy contests; proxy contests for corporate control; and proxy contests for
representation on a board of directors (typically to gain one or two seats on a board). Each
one of these has different historical average success rates and a more sophisticated analysis
would use that data as a baseline for each individual contest of the appropriate type.
Second, implicit in our analysis is an underlying assumption that historical success
rates are set at the “correct” or “efficient” level of success for the market for corporate
control. While we believe that the status quo is generally acceptable to the Delaware
judiciary, some scholars have advocated in favor of opening up the market for corporate
control, see generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, While other authors have
claimed it needs to be closed down. See Lipton, supra note 229. Obviously, if either of these
views were adopted, the appropriate likelihood of success would need to be adjusted
accordingly.
237. Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth?: The
Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 219
(2009).
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actors, either for or against management. Doing this requires us to consider the
nature of the contest, the role of the proxy voting advisor, and the goals of the
particular bidder/investor. As we will show, the preclusive effects of takeover
defenses vary depending on the nature of the vote and the type of dissident. In
order to truly assess defensive tactics, courts must consider all of these factors.
We begin by examining the principal actors in corporate battles, including the
different types of dissident shareholders, and how the different corporate defenses
will affect their respective behaviors. Then we discuss the roles of the proxy
advisor and how they react to the various strategies employed by management and
dissidents. Finally, we will consider how this information can be aggregated into
our analysis of Unocal’s second prong.
A. Strategic Acquirers, Private Equity Firms, and Hedge Funds
Who are the most common participants in corporate contests and what are their
biases? To answer this question, we need to come up with a relatively simple, yet
descriptive, typology for the broad categories of acquirers that participate in this
market. We are aware that there are a wide variety of potential participants in the
market for corporate control, using a broad array of types of techniques, including
hostile and friendly transactions, tender offers, and proxy contests, and that any
typology that we employ will undoubtedly oversimplify and misclassify certain
groups of these purchasers. But, we think that there are three particularly important
types of potential participants that we need to examine—strategic buyers, financial
buyers, and hedge fund activists—and that doing so will markedly improve courts’
analysis of takeover defenses and their effects.
1. Strategic Acquirers
Strategic acquirers want to gain control of the target company, typically to
integrate the firm into their ongoing operations, so that they can gain operational
efficiencies, cost reductions, or other benefits.238 They could be in the same
industry as the target firm or, if in a different industry, can see the potential for
incorporating the target firm into their operations so as to create value. The
touchstone is that they are interested in the target firm because it fits into their longrange plans for their own business. Strategic bidders often have the highest
potential valuation for target firms as they are best equipped to recognize
synergistic value gains from combining target assets with their own assets to
generate higher value for the combined firm,239 in addition to the other forms of
efficiency gains that other types of bidders can realize from the acquisition.

238. GILSON & BLACK, supra note 154, at 258–311 (discussing various sources of
operational synergistic value creation for strategic bidders); Roberta Romano, A Guide to
Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 125–26 (1992). This
concept is often referred to as “operational synergy.” “Operational synergy involves the
prospect of improvements in the productive activities of the two companies.” GILSON &
BLACK, supra note 154, at 258.
239. Bargeron et al., supra note 28, at 376 (operating companies can realize synergy
gains from an acquisition, whereas private equity buyers do not recognize such gains).
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Strategic bidders deploy a wide array of methods of making control
acquisitions, including tender offers, mergers, asset purchases, or voting contests,
sometimes coupled with a tender offer. These efforts can be supported by target
management (“friendly” deals) or resisted by target management (“hostile” deals).
As a practical matter, many initially hostile deals subsequently turn friendly as the
target company board changes its mind about the acquisition proposal.240
For strategic bidders, the poison pill and its trigger level are of primary concern
to hostile bidders, because for friendly deals the target board can choose to waive
the protections of the rights plan to permit the friendly deal to move forward.
However, the poison pill may also adversely affect the ability of a third-party
bidder to upset an initially friendly deal between its target and a prior bidder if that
transaction does not constitute a “sale” under the Revlon doctrine.241 Under the
Revlon line of cases, the Delaware courts have permitted target firms to protect preexisting transactions that further the long-term business strategy of the company so
long as control remains in the market place after the protected transaction is
completed.242 This protection will not extend to financial buyer-sponsored buyouts
that are structured as all cash deals (because they trigger Revlon) so that the rights
plan does not prevent strategic bidders from making topping bids in that
situation.243
Voting rights come into play for strategic buyers in proxy contests for corporate
control. These battles arise in two situations: first, when the strategic bidder needs
to gain control of the target firm in order to remove its rights plan (and possibly
other antitakeover defenses) so that it can close its tender offer; and second, if the
acquisition is structured solely as a proxy contest to replace the target board
without acquiring a controlling interest in the target firm’s stock.244
Voting rights may play a second important role when the strategic bidder’s
transaction is a friendly merger, or becomes a friendly merger. In these cases, the
target firm’s shareholders must approve the transaction before it can be

Private equity firms may also be able to realize certain synergistic gains, such as economies
of scale, in “roll up” transactions, where they acquire multiple small companies that operate
in
the
same
industry
and
combine
them.
Rollup,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rollup. For examples, see Roll Up, Roll Up: Banks and Private
Equity, ECONOMIST, Jan. 10, 2009, at 65; Ashley D. Torres, Jacobs Private Equity Invests in
FLA.
BUS.
J.
(Sept.
20,
2011),
XPO
Logistics,
S.
http://www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/news/2011/09/20/jacobs-private-equity-invests-inxpo.html.
240. Weyerhauser’s acquisition of Williamette Industries, discussed in Lipton, supra note
217, at 1057–59, is a good example of a hostile deal that turned friendly once the target’s
board determined that the price being offered was sufficiently high to merit a sale of the
company.
241. Briefly, the Revlon doctrine applies under Delaware law whenever there is a “sale of
control” or other form of sale of the corporation. Paramount Commc’ns., Inc. v. QVC
Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993). Once Revlon is triggered, enhanced judicial scrutiny
is applied to any actions that a target board of directors takes that favor a particular bidder.
Id.
242. See, e.g., Paramount, 637 A.2d at 47.
243. See, e.g., In re Mony Grp. S’holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9, 21 (Del. Ch. 2004).
244. GILSON & BLACK, supra note 154, at 1401.
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consummated. If a higher bid comes forward, or if the target firm shareholders
believe that the initial bid was too low, they may vote down the merger proposal.245
Poison pills adversely affect strategic acquirers in a number of ways. If the
acquirer makes a tender offer for the outstanding shares, then the more shares the
acquirer holds, the more that he can himself benefit from the increase in the price.
A large stake in the corporation also allows the acquirer to benefit should a rival
suitor eventually outbid him because they can sell their holdings at a profit and
offset their search costs.246 By effectively capping his holdings, a poison pill limits
the benefits of a takeover. In addition, the fewer shares that an acquirer holds, the
more difficult it will be to convince other shareholders (and proxy advisors) that the
offer is a credible one. For both these reasons, the size of a poison pill trigger can
be of great significance to a hostile strategic acquirer.
For the hostile strategic bidder, the existence of a staggered board is also a
serious impediment to completing an acquisition. The staggered board may require
that the bidder succeed in two consecutive proxy contests in order to take control of
the corporation and dismantle any other defenses.247 This raises not only the cost of
a contest but also the uncertainty of success. Moreover, the extended time frame for
the contest opens up opportunities for competitors to enter the market for the target
company.
2. Financial Buyers
Financial buyers are interested in the target company primarily because of its
cash flows and future exit options.248 Private equity firms are frequent sponsors of
leveraged buyouts (LBOs) of large public companies.249 While private equity

245. While once this was a rare event, in recent years, hedge fund activists engaged in
merger-arbitrage activity have been quite successful in forcing companies to either raise the
amount of the merger consideration or withdraw the proposed merger. See infra Part IV.A.3.
246. Bebchuk, supra note 30, at 1777 n.171 (bidder profits from ownership stakes in
target firm usually offset the bidder’s search costs and bid commencement fees); James C.
Freund & Richard L. Easton, The Three Piece Suitor: An Alternative Approach to
Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 34 BUS. LAW. 1679, 1683 (1979) (discussing common
practice of acquirers buying large stake in target firm before announcing bid).
247. Miller, supra note 193, at 12–27 (“In a takeover battle at targets with classified
boards, a tender offer coupled with a successful proxy fight for a single class of directors is
often the offensive maneuver that leads to a target’s sale to the hostile acquirer . . . .”).
248. JOSHUA ROSEBAUM & JOSHUA PEARL, INVESTMENT BANKING: VALUATION,
LEVERAGED BUYOUTS, AND MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 161 (2009); see also Financial vs.
Strategic Buyers, MERCER CAPITAL (2011), http://www.mercercapital.com/print/?id=310
(“Financial buyers can generally be classified as investors interested in the return they can
achieve by buying a business. They are interested in the cash flow generated by a business
and the future exit opportunities from the business.”).
249. Douglas Cumming, Donald S. Siegel & Mike Wright, Private Equity, Leveraged
Buyouts and Governance, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 439, 439–40 (2007). “Leveraged buyouts involve
institutional investors and financial sponsors (like a private equity firm) making large
acquisitions without committing all the capital required for the acquisition.” Leveraged
Buyouts, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leveraged_buyout. For a simple diagram
of the structure of a leveraged buyout, see id.
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embraces a broad category of investments, here we are concerned with private
equity buyout funds that concentrate their efforts on LBOs via a going private
transaction.250 We are interested in this type of private equity transaction because it
results in a change of control of a publicly held corporation with the elimination of
the public shareholders.
Most private equity transactions, that is, typical LBOs or going private
transactions, are structured as a purchase of all of the publicly held stock of a public
corporation by a privately held acquisition vehicle controlled by the buyer.251 The
private equity firm sponsoring the transaction will obtain its capital from equity
contributions from one of its investment funds (as well as much smaller
contributions from the managers of the portfolio firm) and combine them with the
cash proceeds from loans secured by the assets of the target firm.252 Each portfolio
firm will then be operated on a stand-alone basis.253
Private equity firms almost always do friendly deals with target board approval,
and frequently with the active participation of the target management as part of the
buyout team.254 If the sale is structured as an auction of the target firm, the rights
plan is generally not an issue in the initial rounds of bidding that take place but may
be used to protect the winning bid from topping bids.
Private equity firms do confront voting issues in their transactions, but these are
largely related to shareholder approval of mergers.255 The most significant set of
recent voting issues for private equity buyers have arisen when hedge fund activist
shareholders engaged in merger arbitrage have objected to the consideration offered
in particular buyouts.256 In these circumstances, the rights-plan trigger level may

250. These include venture capital, midstage company finance, distressed firm
investment, LBOs of divisions or subsidiaries of public companies, and going private deals.
See generally Masulis & Thomas, supra note 237. Going private transactions are when a
private equity firm, often in conjunction with a target company’s major shareholders or
management, buys out the public shareholders’ stockholdings. ROBERT B. THOMPSON,
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: LAW AND FINANCE 443–47 (2010).
251. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J.
ECON. PERSP. 121, 124 (2009). For a general discussion of these transactions, see THOMPSON,
supra note 250, at 443–47.
252. Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 251, at 123–25.
253. Stephen D. Prowse, The Economics of the Private Equity Market, ECON. R., Third
Quarter
1988,
at
21,
28–29,
available
at
http://www.dallasfed.org/research/er/1998/er9803c.pdf. For a simple pictorial explanation of
the structure of private equity deals and portfolio companies, see Private Equity Fund
Structure, CAPITAL GATE, http;//www.capitalgate.com/private_equity_fund_structure.html.
254. The Revlon case is a good illustration of this process. Revlon management was
included as part of the buyout group in the initial private equity deal proposed to the Revlon
board of directors in response to Pantry Pride’s hostile offer. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 178 (Del. 1986).
255. Since private equity transactions are friendly transactions, they involve either a
single-step merger or a two-step tender offer followed by a merger. Because target
management wants the deal to be completed, the private equity firm does not need to solicit
votes in contested elections except in unusual situations.
256. Commonly, merger arbitrage is when
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help private equity firms by stopping potential objectors from accumulating larger
equity stakes and the associated voting rights in the target firm. This would hold
true even if the hedge funds, or other objecting shareholders, are able to obtain
target firm voting rights without the associated equity interest, so called “empty
voting,”257 because the poison pill still limits their voting power (or the voting
power of all the members of their “group”) to the maximum percentage specified in
its trigger level.258
For similar reasons, a staggered board will be of little concern to a private equity
purchaser. Since the transaction is likely to be friendly, there is no need to replace
the board. In fact, a staggered board is a benefit to such a purchaser since it will
impede any competing bids, thus making the completion of the purchase more
likely.
3. Shareholder Activist Hedge Funds
Hedge funds can “generally have four characteristics: (1) they are pooled,
privately organized investment vehicles; (2) they are administered by professional
investment managers; (3) they are not widely available to the public; and (4) they
operate outside of securities regulation and registration requirements.”259 Hedge
funds focus on particular private markets, the focus of which differentiates them
from private equity or venture capital funds that also have these four
characteristics.260 Hedge funds also avoid being regulated as mutual funds because
they have a relatively small number of sophisticated or wealthy individual and
institutional investors.261
While hedge funds engage in a wide variety of investment strategies, we are
interested in hedge funds that have acted as shareholder-activist investors on issues
a hedge fund takes a long position in a merger target and a short position in the
acquirer and simply waits for the merger to close. The hedge fund makes a
spread upfront between the higher value of the short target position and the
lower value of the long acquirer position. At the merger closing, the two
positions offset.
Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 192, at 125. For a more complete discussion, see THOMAS
KIRCHNER, MERGER ARBITRAGE: HOW TO PROFIT FROM EVENT-DRIVEN ARBITRAGE (2009).
For
a
simpler
explanation,
see
Risk
Arbitrage,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_arbitrage.
257. See generally Crown Emak Partners v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377 (Del. 2010); Henry T.C.
Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable)
Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006).
258. Thomas, supra note 1, at 512–13.
259. Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 192, at 115 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006))
(providing the Securities Act of 1933 registration requirements); id. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A)
(providing the Investment Company Act of 1940 registration requirements); id. § 80a-3(c)(7)
(providing the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 reporting obligations); id. § 80b-3(b)
(providing Investment Advisers Act of 1940 registration requirements)).
260. Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 192, at 115.
261. Most hedge funds are exempt from the Investment Company Act of 1940, either
because (1) they have 100 or fewer beneficial owners and do not offer their securities to the
public, or (2) all of their investors are “qualified” high net-worth individuals or institutions.
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3c(1), (7).
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related to governance and strategy. A common technique is for a fund to take a
substantial long position in a firm’s shares and then demand changes in that firm’s
governance and strategy.262 As one of us has found in prior work, hedge funds
influence corporate boards and managements by holding 5–10% positions263 in
small numbers of companies, then working with other hedge funds and investors.
They target undervalued companies that are profitable but with significantly higher
institutional ownership and trading liquidity.264 These characteristics make it easier
for the activists and their allies to acquire significant stakes quickly.
Hedge fund activists use a wide variety of tactics to pursue their objectives, and
are largely successful even though they hold relatively small stakes.265 Hedge fund
activists frequently take friendly positions toward target management, but other
times they are openly confrontational with them. They generally are not interested
in taking control of the company, but rather hope to act as minority investors with
other shareholders’ support to force value-enhancing changes in the target
company.266 In earlier work, one of us found that activism aimed at the sale of the
target generates the highest returns, with financial restructuring transactions also
generating a significant abnormal return.267
Hedge funds are significantly different from strategic buyers and private equity
firms because they are not generally actual purchasers of the firms that they target.
Instead, they act as catalysts for change, sometimes pushing companies to put
themselves up for sale (often to private equity firms), other times forcing a
reluctant target firm to engage in financial restructuring or a host of other possible
actions.268 When hedge funds use the ballot box, it is generally in support of a
“short-slate” proxy contest where they seek to gain representation on a targeted
firm’s board of directors.269 The key to hedge funds’ success is to generate investor
pressure on a target firm to make changes.
The rights-plan trigger level is unlikely to directly affect the hedge fund activist.
The activist fund itself will generally have a relatively small stake in the targeted
firm, and will studiously avoid engaging in any type of conversation with other
investors to avoid creating a “group” whose holdings would exceed the trigger
level of the poison pill.
As with private equity, the existence of a staggered board is of little
consequence to a hedge fund. A hedge fund will mostly be interested in gaining

262. Brav et al., supra note 165, at 1741–45 (summarizing hedge funds’ stated objectives
after acquiring substantial stock position in target firm).
263. The median initial (maximum) percentage stake that a hedge fund takes in the target
is 6.3% (9.1%), and the median dollar stake, at cost, is $11.9 ($15.8) million in 2006constant dollars. Id. at 1747.
264. Id. at 1749–55 (analyzing hedge fund targeting metrics).
265. Id. at 1747 (showing ownership positions), 1756 (showing stock price performance
of targeted firms).
266. Id. at 1742.
267. Id. at 1759.
268. Id. at 1742.
269. Jared L. Landaw, Keith E. Gottfried & Barry H. Genkin, The Ten Elements of a
Proxy Contest Settlement, 26 ACC DOCKET, Apr. 2008, at 74, 78.
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representation on the board rather than taking control of it. A short-slate contest can
be as effective in a staggered board as it is for a nonstaggered board.
B. Description of Third-Party Voting Advisors
As we discussed above, proxy-voting advisors give advice to institutional
investors, and others, about how to vote their shares.270 ISS is the leading proxyadvisory firm in the world with clients such as forty-three of the largest fifty mutual
fund groups.271 Voting recommendations by ISS are viewed as influential, if not
determinative, in proxy contests.272 For example, companies involved in voting
contests will often issue press releases pointing to favorable ISS voting
recommendations. Given the dominance of the ISS and the concentration of the
market in the proxy advisory services, some commentators have criticized ISS’
“virtual monopoly.”273
Institutional investors overwhelming use the services of ISS and the other thirdparty voting advisors, and empirical research has shown that a recommendation by
ISS has an impact on the outcome in shareholder voting contests.274 Institutional
Shareholder Services’ (ISS’) influence will vary across firms depending on the
degree of institutional ownership of those firms’ stock, but should be significant for
many of them.275 Moreover, their recommendations will introduce a bias toward
certain groups of dissidents and away from others.
To understand this point, consider first that these advisors, particularly ISS,
issue recommendations on both control contests and contests that merely seek
representation on a target firm’s board of directors. ISS will often issue a favorable
recommendation for dissident shareholders seeking to elect a minority of directors
through short-slate proxy contests.276 Shareholder activist hedge funds run a
disproportionate number of short-slate contests, so they are the primary
beneficiaries of these recommendations. 277

270. See supra notes 194–99 and accompanying text.
271. Cotter et al., supra note 194, at 7.
272. Alexander et al., supra note 194, at 34–35.
273. See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing
Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 296–97 (2003) (citing problems
of limited competition in proxy advisory services).
274. Alexander et al., supra note 194, at 270; Choi et al., supra note 194, at 657; Cotter et
al., supra note 194, at 55.
275. Alexander et al., supra note 194, at 2 (discussing proxy fight over merger of
Compaq Computer and Hewlett Packard Co. and stating “[o]bservers largely credited the
favorable recommendation of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), a leading proxy
advisory service, with turning the tide in favor of the controversial merger proposal”)
276. From 2006 to 2011, ISS supported hedge fund dissidents in fifty out of the seventyeight contests where they sought board representation, but in the eleven contests where board
control was at issue, ISS never supported the full dissident slate. INNISFREE M&A INC.,
VOTING ADVISORY SERVICES AND SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM – SELECTED STATISTICS 1 (2011).
277. In the fifty proxy contests where ISS supported dissident shareholders’ candidates,
at least one of those candidates gained a board seat in 70% of the contests. Id.
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By contrast, strategic buyers tend to launch proxy contests to replace either a
controlling portion or the entire board of a target firm.278 ISS also issues voting
recommendations in these contests, but the voting recommendations are less likely
to favor the acquirer than ISS’ short-slate recommendations favor dissidents,279 as
valuation is a significant, if not overriding factor, in the decisions of ISS regarding
strategic slates. This will reduce the bidder’s likelihood of success and raise its
costs for conducting the proxy contest since it will need to persuade all of the
shareholders individually rather than focusing on ISS and having them send the
necessary signal to their clients. The net effect of the differing impact of ISS is to
favor hedge funds over strategic acquirers.
C. Incorporating These Factors into the Range of Reasonableness Analysis
Under Unocal’s second prong, takeover tactics cannot be preclusive, and even if
they are not, they must still fall within the range of reasonableness.280 Given that
we have just shown the importance of differentiating between the different types of
bidders in judicial analysis, how should these differences be analyzed within the
Unocal framework? We think that this type of more subtle differentiation would be
best accomplished by courts in their consideration of the range of reasonableness
part of the second prong of Unocal because a court’s ability to incorporate different
factors into the mathematical model we use for preclusion is already stretched to
the limit. The second set of factors that we introduced in this section are more
easily considered on an ad hoc basis by the court as a more nuanced way of
determining if the overall response of the target to the dissident is reasonable.281
How would a court do this? Consider the effects of a broad interpretation of
Selectica, one that permits an across the board lowering of trigger levels for all
rights plans. In a range of reasonableness determination considering both the type
of bidder and the effects of third-party voting advisors, we believe that this would
tilt Delaware law in favor of hedge funds and private equity firms over strategic
acquirers, and would greatly increase the power of third-party voting advisors.282

278. Confidential email from proxy solicitor to Randall Thomas (Sept. 21, 2011) (on file
with author).
279. Miller, supra note 193, at 12–26 (“[A]lthough some proxy advisory services
(including ISS) have a clear track record of supporting the election of a minority of dissident
directors, they have offered far less frequent support, and applied greater scrutiny, to slates
seeking majority control.”).
280. Unitrin Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387 (Del. 1995).
281. The Delaware Supreme Court’s analysis in Selectica is a good illustration of how
courts are already taking into consideration additional factors about a bidder in their range of
reasonableness analysis even after they complete their consideration of the preclusive effect
of takeover defenses. See 5 A.3d 586, 605–06 (Del. 2010) (describing Trilogy as a
competitor, creditor, and shareholder of Selectica).
282. Our analysis is largely consistent with what the Delaware Supreme Court did in its
range of reasonableness analysis, where it considered not only Trilogy’s interest as a bidder,
but also its other interests as a competitor and a creditor of Selectica. Id. at 605. We think
that in order to give the range of reasonableness part of the Unocal analysis any substance,
courts need to not only consider these factors in the abstract but also attach some weight to
them in determining whether or not to uphold defensive tactics as they did in Selectica. We
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To demonstrate our point, we begin by noting that, as a matter of public policy,
corporate law should not treat strategic acquirers worse than hedge funds or private
equity funds, as the former may attach higher valuations to the target firm’s assets.
We believe that a broad reading of Selectica will have this effect for several
reasons. First, a 5% poison pill trigger level may decrease the amount of stock that
a potential strategic acquirer can accumulate, thereby making it more difficult for
such a bidder to prevail in a proxy contest for corporate control as it will directly
control fewer votes. The impact of this effect will be stronger for strategic acquirers
than hedge funds, or private equity firms, because strategic acquirers use proxy
contests for corporate control more frequently than other types of potential
bidders.283
Second, strategic acquirers frequently buy large toehold stakes in targeted
firms.284 This large target stock position helps offset the costs of an unsuccessful
bid in the event that another bidder tops their offer and also allows them to buy
some target stock at the pre-offer price. Reducing the amount of target stock that
strategic acquirers can accumulate will decrease the expected value of a takeover
attempt and adversely affect their incentive to pursue value-enhancing acquisitions.
Forcing strategic bidders to take smaller toeholds in target firms also reduce their
incentives to launch proxy contests for corporate control as they will receive a
smaller percentage of the benefits from improving target-firm operations.
Third, strategic bidders with smaller stakes in target firms will find it harder to
signal to the market that they are serious bidders. Large stakes send a strong signal
to the market, and to third-party voting advisors, that the acquirer is seriously
pursuing the target and believes it is undervalued. It will be harder to a strategic
acquirer to convince other shareholders, and third-party voting advisors, about its
true intentions if it cannot put its money where its mouth is.
Turning to hedge funds, the median size of their initial stock positions are only
6.3%,285 far below the usual 15 to 20% trigger level of current rights plans,286
although slightly higher than a 5% pill trigger level. Private equity firms almost
always engage in friendly transactions and therefore target boards waive the
provisions of the poison pill for them. We conclude that lower pill triggers will

assume that this is the reason that the Delaware courts have gone to such great lengths to
include this additional piece in the Unocal test.
283. Confidential email from proxy solicitor to Randall Thomas (Sept. 21, 2011) (on file
with author). “[A]ctivist hedge funds are generally not interested in taking control of the
company.” Brav et al., supra note 165, at 1748.
284. Sandra Betton & B. Espen Eckbo, Toeholds, Bid-Jumps, and Expected Payoffs in
Takeovers, 13 REV. FIN. STUD. 841, 858 tbl.4, 879 (2000) (finding an average toehold of
14.57% but that only 53% of bids in the sample had toeholds); Michael Bradley, Anand
Desai & E. Han Kim, Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and Their Division
Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 6 tbl.1 (1988)
(reporting bidders have average toeholds of 10% at the time of takeover bid). For a more
theoretical discussion, see Bebchuk, supra note 30 (bidder profits from ownership stakes in
target firm usually offset the bidder’s search costs and bid commencement fees); Freund &
Easton, supra note 246, at 1777 n.171 (1979) (discussing common practice of acquirers
buying large stake in target firm before announcing bid).
285. Brav et al., supra note 165, at 1747.
286. BROWN ET AL., supra note 2, at 16-41.
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penalize strategic acquirers and, to a lesser extent, hedge funds relative to private
equity firms.
Another effect of lower rights-plan triggers will be to increase the power of
third-party voting advisors, such as ISS or Glass Lewis. To see this point, notice
that the absence of strong signals by strategic bidders will expand these advisors’
role in the voting process as the information that they provide to institutional
investors and other block holders about potential acquisitions becomes relatively
more important. Furthermore, if strategic buyers hold less stock, then the rest of the
market will hold more, so that, all other things being equal, voting advisors’ clients
will hold a larger percentage of the voting shares in a proxy fight or sale situation,
again increasing their influence. If the Delaware courts are concerned about the
potential agency costs associated with extensive reliance on third-party voting
advisors,287 they should consider whether their actions increase those costs.
Finally, hedge funds’ incentives to start proxy contests should be relatively
unaffected.288 In proxy fights, the dissident hedge fund often gets strong voting
support from other hedge funds holding the target firm stock. Frequently these
other hedge funds came into the stock because their opportunity analysis was
similar to that of the dissident, so it is not surprising that they would be sympathetic
to the dissident’s agenda. Somewhat less frequently, a dissident hedge fund may
attract “follower” hedge funds that buy in simply because of the dissident’s
ownership (the “wolf pack” phenomenon) and could be expected to vote
similarly.289 To the extent that hedge funds rely on institutional investors for
support in short-slate contests, third-party voting advisors should continue to
support them as in the past. Typically, advisors give favorable recommendations to
short-slate contests that seek to remove only a handful of directors, and these are
the most popular type of contest for hedge funds.290 Institutional investors are likely
to follow the voting advisors’ recommendations in these noncontrol situations.

287. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to
Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1765
(2006).
288. Professor Jeffrey Gordon pointed out to us that the lower trigger level may reduce
hedge fund returns by capping the number of shares over which those costs can be
distributed. Email from Jeffrey Gordon, Richard Paul Richman Professor of Law, Columbia
Law School, to Randall Thomas (Jan. 10, 2012) (on file with author). While we agree with
this point, we note that what is key to our analysis is the relative impact of the drop in the
trigger level on hedge funds versus hostile strategic bidders. Hostile bidders’ costs are likely
to be substantially higher than hedge funds’ costs. This is because the hostile bidder needs to
arrange financing for the acquisition of at least a controlling stake in the target firm plus run
a full-fledged control contest, whereas hedge funds are buying a much smaller stake in the
target and only conducting a short slate contest. The reduction of the pill trigger from 15 to
5%, will force hostile bidders to drop their initial stake to 5% and spread their higher costs
over that smaller block. Hedge funds may need to drop their stake as well, but by
significantly less, and then spread their relatively lower costs over their 5% block. As a
result, the decline in the trigger level will disproportionately affect strategic bidders.
289. Confidential email from proxy solicitor to Randall Thomas (Sept. 23, 2011) (on file
with author).
290. Miller, supra note 193, at 12–26.
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By comparison, strategic bidders will launch fewer proxy contests for corporate
control because of their reduced benefits from success. Third-party voting advisors’
recommendations in control contests are generally less influential because
institutional investors make their own minds up in these relatively rare, but
economically significant, transactions. The overall result will be more short-slate
contests and fewer control contests, which should increase the influence of thirdparty advisors on balance.
A second example further underscores why the type of bidder can make a big
difference in understanding the preclusive effects of different defensive
combinations. In this example, we note that the combination of a low (5%) pill
trigger and a classified board is likely to be a formidable hurdle for a strategic
buyer. The enforced delay of the classified board increases the likelihood of the
dissident losing as well as creates delay in obtaining any potential financial payoff.
The low trigger pill prevents the acquirer both from giving a strong signal to the
market about its intentions as well as limiting its benefit from a run up in the stock
price. The acquirer may have trouble convincing a proxy advisor to give a positive
signal because of this limitation as well.
On the other hand, the same combination of defenses is much less likely to be an
impediment for a hedge fund interested in getting representation on a board via a
short slate. The fund will likely not desire a very large holding in the company and
the staggered board is irrelevant to this objective. The hedge fund may very likely
gain the support of a proxy advisor, which commonly supports such contests.
Thus, this particular set of the defenses is more onerous for the strategic acquirer
than for the hedge fund. Our basic model of preclusion does not directly
incorporate these important differences. However, in a range of reasonableness
analysis a court could explicitly consider these factors in assessing the defensive
response of the target firm. A court could also take into account whether the
strategic acquirer is attempting a value-increasing transaction, or the hedge fund is
engaged in a value-transferring transaction. Similarly, a court might consider it
unreasonable to use certain defenses to prevent a takeover by a strategic bidder,
even though on a different set of facts it could find they are perfectly fine to prevent
a hedge fund to gain representation, or vice versa.
In sum, the second portion of the second prong of Unocal, the range of
reasonableness analysis, can be used to fine-tune the first portion, the preclusion
analysis, by incorporating these important differences. In this way, courts could
finely calibrate their Unocal analysis so as to ensure that value-added transactions
are not unduly penalized, while value-transferring ones move forward unimpeded.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Delaware courts have expended enormous time and energy in their ongoing
analysis of defensive tactics under the Unocal/Unitrin standard. While we agree
with much of what they have done, we think that it is important for the court to
provide a single standard of what constitutes a “preclusive” defensive tactic under
Delaware law and to more transparently apply that standard. To begin with, we
believe that they should explain the difference between Unitrin’s “realistically
unattainable” and Moran’s “fundamentally restricts” standard. The latter phrase
suggests that the dissident must have a more meaningful chance of success in a
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proxy contest than the former. Moreover, it is not clear under either standard what
chance of dissident success is sufficient.
Once these issues are clarified, we urge the court to adopt a simple, weighted
voting model to calculate the impact of different defenses on the dissident’s
likelihood of success in a proxy contest. This model has the virtue of directly
incorporating the share ownership patterns for any company directly into its
analysis, while also considering the effect of proxy voting advisors on the outcome
of such a vote. Finally, it provides a direct estimate of the likelihood of success of
the dissident based on the particular defenses employed by the target company.
To avoid overly complicating the model, we urge the court to use the range of
reasonableness analysis, when needed, as a way of considering several other
important aspects of corporate elections. In particular, we argue that the court needs
to consider the type of bidder that is involved in the proposed transaction, the type
of contest that they are engaged in, and the effect of these two factors on the thirdparty voting advisors advice to its clients. We provide two examples of important
defensive tactics to illustrate why these effects are so important.
The first example shows that an across the board approval of low trigger-level
poison pills will tilt the acquisition playing field in favor of hedge funds at the
expense of strategic bidders, while also greatly increasing the power of third-party
voting advisors. Our second example demonstrates how a court’s analysis of the
effects of the combination of a classified board and a poison pill should take into
account the type of voting contest being run as well as the type of bidder involved
in the contest.
In the final analysis, we would hope that the court will clarify the legal standard
it is applying in these cases, as it has far reaching effects. Delaware has carefully
crafted its law to favor proxy contests over market transactions291 and to subject
acquisitions to close judicial scrutiny only when they involve a “change of
control.”292 It must be careful lest it permit sudden changes that will throw its
system into disequilibrium. We foresee that a broad endorsement of 5% rights
plans’ triggers will shift the legal landscape.293 An across the board reduction of
poison pill trigger levels would discriminate against strategic bidders in favor of
hedge funds and private equity firms. It would also greatly increase the power of
third-party proxy voting advisors by giving them the deciding vote in most
corporate elections. If the court does not wish to cause these types of changes to the

291. Gilson, supra note 69, at 502.
292. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46–47 (Del. 1993).
293. We note that widespread use of such a trigger level would also reduce the amount of
information available to the marketplace about potential takeover bids as it would interact
with the 5% trigger for disclosure obligations contained in section 13(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(d) (2006). In other words, since the pill threshold
would stop potential bidders from purchasing more than 5% of the target’s stock, they would
no longer have to disclose their holdings under section 13(d).
A second effect will be an overall decline in the number of large stockholders at
public companies. These blockholders are generally thought to be the most effective type of
monitors of potential management misconduct and add value for that reason. Clifford G.
Holderness, A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control, ECON. POL’Y REV., April
2003, at 51. Reducing the number of blockholders should have a negative overall effect on
many corporations.
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American corporate governance system, then it should take action to forestall a
drop in poison pill trigger levels.
VI. TECHNICAL APPENDIX
In this Part, we formally describe the voting model used in this paper. An earlier
version was introduced to study the effect of ownership structure on the likelihood
of a successful corporate takeover.294 The model is designed to incorporate two
important aspects of voting in corporate governance. The first is that there are blocs
and not just single shares being voted, and the second is that there is an external
signaler advising at least some of the participants on the vote. The model itself is a
probabilistic version of a standard weighted voting model from the theory of
cooperative games. For background the reader might consult Owen.295
The first part of our model describes weighted voting. Let V= {v1,v2,…,vn} be a
set of voters and suppose that voter vi votes a percentage si of the outstanding
shares in favor of management with probability pi. A subset A⊆V of the voters can
carry the election if

∑

i∈ A

s i > 50

and the probability that every voter in A votes in favor of management and every
other voter is against is

∏ p ∏ (1 − p ) .
i

i∈ A

j

j∉ A

It follows, then, from elementary probability that the probability that the vote will
be in favor of management is given by

∑

{ A⊆V |

∑

∏ p ∏ (1 − p ).

si >50} i∈A

i

j

j∉A

i∈ A

The second part of our model is to include a signaling agent that affects the
value pi for some of the voters. We divide the voters into three groups. The first
group of voters will cast their vote with a fixed probability although these
probabilities need not be all the same. For example, the voter we designate
Management will cast a vote in favor of management with probability 1.
A second class of voters will cast their vote in accordance with a signal they
receive from an advisory agent I. Let I be an agent that issues one of two
recommendations, either For, which is in support of management or Against. If a
For recommendation is issued then this second class casts a vote in favor of

294. Edelman & Thomas, supra note 196, at 465.
295. GUILLERMO OWEN, GAME THEORY 212 (3d ed. 1995).
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management with a probability p where p is distributed according to the probability
density function

0 if x ≤ .5,


f ( x ) = 8 x − 4 if .5 ≤ x ≤ 1,

0 if 1 < x.

a graph of which is pictured in Figure 1.

Figure 1
The intuition behind this choice of distribution function is that when presented with
a For signal, the shareholders will most likely vote with management, but there
may be some combination of noise in the signal that makes it less than a sure
thing.296 In a similar way, a signal of Against results in the choice of a probability p
taken from the distribution function

0 if x < 0,

g ( x ) = 4 − 8 x if 0 ≤ x ≤ .5,
0 if .5 ≤ x.

whose graph is shown in Figure 2.

296. This function is somewhat different than the one we employed in our earlier work.
See Edelman & Thomas, supra note 200, at 466. The motivation for the change is that in the
current application we will be assuming that the proxy advisor will be giving more in-depth
analysis because more parties will be relying on it for information. With a more in-depth
analysis comes increased opportunity for confusion. So we assume that the signal given by
the advisor will be more open to interpretation and hence somewhat less strong.
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Figure 2
The vote of the last class of voters, while correlated with the signal given by I, is
not as tightly controlled as the second class. For this last class of voters we use a
two-parameter family of functions, r(k,t,x), defined by

h(k , x)(1 − t ) + t t ≥ 0,
r ( k , t , x) = 
t≤0
h(k , x)(1 + t )
where h(k,x)=22k(x- ½ )2k+1+ ½. The following graphs show how the parameters k
and t affect the shape of this function.

Figure 3 r(k,0,x) for k=1,3,5,10 and 20
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Figure 4 r(3,t,x) for t= -.3, -.1, 0, .1, and .3
The parameter k controls the flatness of the curve and the parameter t raises and
lowers the curve. We will discuss the modeling significance of these parameters
shortly.
The vote of this last class of shareholders is decided in the following way: If the
signaler I gives a For signal, then a probability p is taken from the density function
f , as with the previous class of shareholders, but this class votes in favor of
management with probability r(k,t,p). The value of k has the effect of making this
class of shareholders more or less influenced by the signal, and the value of t
introduces an underlying bias for or against management independent of the signal.
The same method produces the probability for a vote in favor of management if the
signaler gives an Against signal, only substituting the density function g for f.
The intuition that this model is trying to capture is that, for this last class of
voters, the vote will be correlated with the signaler’s recommendation, but that the
extent of that correlation, and the underlying bias in favor of (or against)
management might vary. Thus, the choice of the function r(1,.3,x) would indicate a
shareholder whose vote will strongly correlate with the signal, but has an
underlying bias in favor of management. The function r(20,-.3,x) results in a vote
weakly correlated with the signal and with an antimanagement bias.
We give now an illustration as to how to put the two parts of this model
together. Suppose the corporation consists of five voters, which we call
Management, Dissident, Institution I, Institution II, and Public. Suppose further that
Management holds 15% of the stock, Dissident holds 12%, Institution I has 30%,
Institution II has 40%, and Public has 3%. We will assign Management the
probability 1 of voting for itself, Dissident a probability of 0 and Public a
probability of .5. Let Institution I listen to the signaler I (that is Institution I is of the
second class of voters described above) and suppose Institution II is of the third
class of voters, with vote governed by r(5,-.2,x), so Institution II is somewhat
biased against management and somewhat sensitive to the signaler.
From this data we can compute the expected probability that Management will
win the election in the case that signaler I issues a For or Against. Suppose the
signaler issues a For signal. Let us look at one scenario in which management wins,
the one in which Management and Institution II vote for management (securing
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15%+40%=55% of the stock in favor) and the other three voters vote against. The
probability of Management, Dissident, and Public voting in this manner is 1, (10)=1, and (1-.5)=.5. The probability of Institution I voting this way is (1-p) where p
is drawn from the distribution g, and the probability of Institution II voting in favor
of management is r(5, -.2,p). So the expected probability of Management winning
the election with exactly this set of votes is
1

∫ 1× (1 − 0) × (1 − x) × r (5,−.2, x) × .5 × (8x − 4) dx =.0344

.5

To compute the likelihood that management will win with some set of votes, we
have to consider all of the different combinations of votes that result in
management winning and integrate over the likelihood of such an outcome. The
result in this instance is .462. That is, with this distribution of stock and the above
assumptions about voting probabilities, if the signaler gives a For signal then we
expect management to win slightly under half of the time.
One of the applications of our model will be to the analysis of defensive tactics
such as a staggered board. In analyzing this situation we will need to compute the
likelihood that management will lose two consecutive elections. If management
wins the first election with probability p and the second election with probability q
(which may be different from p as we describe subsequently) the likelihood of
losing both elections is
(1-p)×(1-q)
and hence the likelihood of winning at least one election is 1-(1-p)×(1-q). Thus, if
in order to succeed the dissident must win two consecutive elections, then
management will win the contest with probability 1-(1-p)×(1-q).
Rather than working in terms of the probability of a management win in the
vote, we could also compute the expected number of votes for management. This is
a much simpler computation. If pi is the probability of voter i casting a bloc of si
shares for management, then the expected vote for management is given by


ݏ ݅

ୀଵ

While being simpler, it is somewhat less informative. Suppose that when
management wins it is by a small margin, but when it loses it is by a large one.
Then the probability of a management victory may well be quite large, but the
expected vote total for management rather small. Nevertheless, it can be useful to
see the model’s predictions in terms of vote totals rather than probabilities.
Having defined the general form of the model, we want to describe the exact
specifications that we made in doing the computations in Part III. To fully specify
the model, we have to choose a distribution of shares among the voters and for each
voter specify the likelihood that he will vote for management given a signal from
the third party. In Part.III.C, we specified the share distribution for each of our
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scenarios. What is left for us to describe is how the voters cast their votes in each of
the two contests we describe.
In Example 1, the proxy contest for corporate control, we will make the
following assumptions: Management always votes for itself (p=1), Dissident
always votes for itself (p=0), Institution I votes according to the recommendation of
the advisor (p=x, where x is taken from the probability density f or g depending on
whether the advisor gives a For or an Against), Institution II is insensitive to the
advisor with a slight bias against management (p=r(20,-.1, x) ), and Institution III is
insensitive to the advisor with a slight bias in favor of management (p=r(20, .2,
x) ).
To study the direct effect of a lower trigger on the success of management in a
proxy contest, we looked at how the likelihood of a win changed as we
redistributed the shares from the dissident to the three categories of institutional
investors. We did the redistribution by dividing the shares taken from the dissident
equally among the institutional investors. Thus, if we moved 9% of the shares from
the dissident we assigned 3% to each of the three types of institutional investors.
In the case of a takeover contest with a tender offer, Example 2 in Part.III.C, we
choose somewhat different probabilities. In this situation, the dissident’s election
platform is much stronger, since he has committed to buy the outstanding shares at
a market premium, if the pill is redeemed. Thus, we assume that the other
shareholders will be more disposed to voting for the dissident than they would be in
Example 1. The specifications we use are: Management votes for itself (p=1),
Dissident always votes for itself (p=0), Institution I votes according to the
recommendation of the advisor (p=x), Institution II votes with a more pronounced
bias against management (p=r(20,-.5, x) ), and Institution III also has a bias against
management (p=r(20, -.2, x) ).
It is important to discuss how sensitive the model is to the choice of the
exogenous parameters. We start with the behavior of the variable k which measures
the sensitivity of the institutional investors to the proxy advisor’s signal. In our
applications this value is set to 20 for both sets of Institutional investors. Even if
this value is lowered to 10 for both sets of investors, the computed probabilities
vary on average by 10%. If both values of k are lowered to 5 the resulting
probabilities can vary by as much as 30%.
Another exogenous variable is t which indicates the bias of the institutional
investors to management. The values of t vary in our applications between -.5 and
.5. Variations of one of these values by an amount of .2 results in a variation of the
computed probabilities of around 25%.
Finally, the model is sensitive to the distribution of shares. For technical
reasons, we have insured that the shareholders cannot be partitioned into two
groups each holding exactly half of the shares. With that exception, it follows from
the discrete nature of the model that small changes in the distribution will not affect
the computed probabilities.
Lastly, we might consider how well this model fits the known empirical results.
In one sense our model is not a very good fit. Recent studies show that a change in
the recommendation of the proxy advisor results in a change of roughly 20–25% in
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the vote for management.297 Using a more stringent definition of the influence of
the advisor, Choi, Fish, and Kahan find that an ISS recommendation shifts 6–10%
of the vote in director elections.298 By contrast, our model shows shifts more
typically in the 13–16% range.
Should this difference be of concern for us? We think not. First, the current
empirical work has focused on routine contests, whereas we are focusing more on
the salient votes in proxy contests or takeover battles. There is little reason to think
that one should expect to see similar numbers given the vastly different issues at
stake.
There is another, and more interesting, reason why we should not expect our
model to conform to the empirical studies. The empirical studies necessarily see
only those elections that take place, not all possible elections. Proxy contests and
takeover battles might be joined and then resolved before there is an actual vote.
Management might agree to add members to the board to avoid short slate
challenge, or they may agree to disarm a pill if they see that resistance is futile.
Thus, the elections that are observed are but a small subset of those that might be
conducted. This adds a systematic bias to the observations which our model would
not exhibit.299

297. Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan, The Impact of the Institutional and Regulatory
Environment on Shareholder Voting, 31 FIN. MGMT. 29, 46 (2002); Jie Cai, Jacqueline L.
Garner & Ralph A. Walkling, Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN. 2389, 2401 (2009). The former
paper analyzes the vote on management proposals, the latter analyzes uncontested director
elections.
298. Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or
Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 906 (2010).
299. This systematic bias is similar to what one observes about cases that actually go to
trial rather than settling. This is the basis for the work of Priest and Klein. See generally
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984).

